922 F.3d 1298
11th Cir.2019Background
- Michael Wade Nance was convicted of malice murder (1997) and, after a retrial of sentencing (2002), again received the death penalty; state courts later adjudicated multiple postconviction proceedings.
- Nance filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising two issues granted a COA: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel at the resentencing for strategic choices about mitigation presentation, and (2) whether wearing a stun belt under his clothes at resentencing violated due process.
- Trial counsel conducted an extensive mitigation investigation: multiple investigators and mitigation specialists, experts, travel to Nance’s hometown, records collection, and ultimately presented 23 mitigation witnesses at resentencing (family, experts on prison adaptability, deputies regarding jail behavior, etc.).
- Nance’s ineffective-assistance claim does not attack investigation adequacy but challenges strategic choices about which mitigation evidence and experts to present at resentencing.
- Georgia Supreme Court rejected both claims on the merits; federal habeas review is therefore governed by AEDPA’s deferential § 2254(d) standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Nance) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel were ineffective at sentencing for strategic decisions about mitigation witnesses/expert evidence | Counsel unreasonably limited presentation of mitigating evidence/experts; strategy deprived Nance of effective assistance | Counsel conducted thorough investigation and made reasonable strategic choices; decisions are insulated from second-guessing | Denied — state court’s rejection was not an unreasonable application of Strickland under AEDPA |
| Whether requiring Nance to wear a stun belt under his clothes without a new hearing violated due process | Stun belt use prejudiced jury/public and required renewed judicial scrutiny/hearing | Stun belt was not visible to jury; Supreme Court has not clearly established that invisible restraints require the same scrutiny as visible restraints | Denied — no clearly established Supreme Court law compelled relief; state-court factual finding that belt was not visible was reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes ineffective-assistance two-part test and deference to reasonable strategy)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; state-court decisions must be objectively unreasonable to permit habeas relief)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (visible shackling during trial forbidden absent an essential state interest specific to the defendant)
- Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (courtroom security deployments judged by whether they are inherently prejudicial to the defendant)
- Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (compelled administration of antipsychotic drugs during trial permissible only with overriding justification; limited to its facts)
- Woodall v. Evans, 572 U.S. 415 (2014) (§ 2254(d)(1) requires Supreme Court holdings, not circuit precedent, to be "clearly established")
- United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002) (stun-belt usage requires close scrutiny — circuit precedent not controlling on AEDPA review)