Michael W. Sloan v. State of Indiana, 16 N.E.3d 1018

In June 2011, 22‑year‑old Michael W. Sloan had sexual intercourse with K.W., who was 13; K.W. testified Sloan was awake and that she told him her age. DNA on K.W. and her clothing included contributors that could not exclude Sloan.
Sloan initially reported to police that he believed he had been raped and was unsure who assaulted him; he later asserted at trial that he had been assaulted while asleep or passed out.
At trial Sloan sought to present testimony from his mother that K.W. told her by telephone that she was 20; the court excluded testimony about K.W.’s alleged statement that she was 20 because the witness had been in the courtroom in violation of a sequestration order and defense counsel had not listed her timely for that purpose.
The jury convicted Sloan of child molesting as a Class A felony. Sloan was sentenced to 35 years (five years above the advisory sentence). The trial court cited lack of explanation, lack of remorse, and need for correctional treatment as aggravators.
On appeal, the court affirmed the conviction, held the exclusion of the mother’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion (harmless/low impact), but found the sentencing aggravators unsupported and remanded for resentencing to the advisory 30‑year term.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court abused discretion by excluding testimony from Sloan’s mother that K.W. told her she was 20	Sloan: testimony was critical to prove he reasonably believed K.W. was at least 16 (statutory defense) and only the mother could corroborate the phone statement	State: testimony was disclosed late, mother violated sequestration, admission would unduly surprise and prejudice State; other evidence of K.W. presenting herself as older was already before jury	Court: No abuse — exclusion was within trial court’s discretion; evidence would not have had probable impact and exclusion did not affect substantial rights
Whether sentencing court abused discretion by finding aggravators and imposing above‑advisory term	Sloan: court improperly enhanced sentence based on his maintaining innocence/lack of explanation and on an unsupported need for correctional treatment	State: lack of remorse and need for treatment supported enhancement (prosecutor cited other conduct)	Court: Abuse of discretion — record did not support findings of lack of remorse or need for correctional treatment; reversed sentencing enhancement and remanded to impose advisory 30 years

Vasquez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2007) (trial court’s evidentiary and procedural decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion; factors for excluding witnesses)
Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1998) (harmless‑error rule for evidentiary rulings affecting substantial rights)
Mathis v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding exclusion of evidence that would not likely affect verdict)
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007) (clarifying sentencing‑statement requirements and abuse‑of‑discretion standard)
Cox v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (court may not enhance sentence for a defendant’s good‑faith maintenance of innocence; lack of remorse is distinct and may be an aggravator)
Ford v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. 1999) (when using "need of correctional treatment" as aggravator, court must articulate why that defendant needs such treatment)
Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing enhancement based on defendant’s maintained innocence where record did not show bad faith)
Hollen v. State, 740 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting use of good‑faith assertion of innocence as aggravator)
Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791 (Ind. 1997) (lack of remorse by one insisting on innocence is only a modest aggravator)
Hawkins v. State, 748 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. 2001) (a single valid aggravator can justify an enhanced sentence)