Michael Threat v. City of Cleveland, Ohio
6 F.4th 672
| 6th Cir. | 2021Background
- Five Black EMS captains (Anderson, Beavers, Noland‑Moore, Threat, Walker) employed by the City of Cleveland bid annually for schedules under a seniority-based system; the EMS Commissioner could reassign up to four captains under the collective‑bargaining agreement.
- In 2017–2018 bidding, several day shifts would have been staffed entirely by Black captains; Commissioner Nicole Carlton reassigned Anderson (and later others in one instance) to create racial “diversity” on the shift, replacing him with a white captain.
- The captains filed administrative charges with state and federal civil‑rights agencies; the city later filed an unfair‑labor‑practice charge against the union arising from media leaks of grievance proceedings.
- The captains sued the city and Carlton under Title VII, the Ohio Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress; the district court dismissed many claims at the pleading stage and granted summary judgment to defendants on the Title VII discrimination claims as not constituting a “materially adverse employment action.”
- The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the discrimination claims under Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act (holding race‑based shift changes can be actionable as terms/privileges of employment) and remanded; it affirmed dismissal of the other claims (third‑party retaliation theory, Beavers’s forfeited retaliation claim, equal‑protection/§ 1983 theories forfeited or not pursued).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether race‑based shift assignments constitute discrimination "with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" under Title VII | Shift schedules and seniority privileges are "terms/privileges" of employment; race‑based reassignments therefore violate § 703(a)(1) | Title VII requires a materially adverse employment action; routine shift changes are not actionable | Court: Shift assignments can be terms/privileges; the reassignments here exceeded de minimis/nonactionable change and state a Title VII claim; reversed and remanded on discrimination claims |
| Whether a de minimis/materiality threshold or prior Sixth Circuit precedent bars shift‑change claims categorically | The particular shift changes here were materially adverse and not de minimis | Prior cases show many shift changes are nonactionable; defendant urges a categorical rule that shift changes are never adverse | Court: No categorical rule; context matters; these race‑based reassignments exceeded any de minimis exception |
| Whether plaintiffs can bring a third‑party retaliation claim based on the city's unfair‑labor‑practice charge against the union (retaliation for protected activity) | The city's ULP against the union retaliated against employees who engaged in protected activity (or their advocates) | Thompson permits only an aggrieved party to sue; the union—not the captains—was injured by the city's ULP | Court: Dismissed third‑party retaliation claims; Thompson does not authorize this novel application |
| Whether remaining state and constitutional claims survive (Ohio retaliation, Beavers's selective‑enforcement claim, equal‑protection/§1983) | Plaintiffs pressed state claims and a selective‑enforcement retaliation claim; asserted equal‑protection theories | Defendants moved to dismiss; some claims not pursued below or argued on appeal | Court: Affirmed dismissal of Ohio retaliation and other non‑discrimination claims; Beavers forfeited her standalone retaliation claim; equal‑protection/§1983 claims forfeited for lack of development on the record |
Key Cases Cited
- Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (definition of "discriminate" as treating similarly situated individuals differently)
- Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337 (direct evidence of race discrimination supports claim)
- Kocsis v. Multi‑Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876 (reassignment analysis is contextual; some reassignments may be more than mere inconvenience)
- Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 U.S. 220 (recognizing the de minimis doctrine as a background canon)
- Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (statutes adopted against background of established common‑law canons like de minimis)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (Title VII protects employment‑related discrimination beyond mere civility)
- Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (Title VII covers non‑economic harms and extends beyond strictly monetary discrimination)
- Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (third‑party retaliation principle: who may sue for retaliation)