Michael Thomas v. Aline Martija
991 F.3d 763
| 7th Cir. | 2021Background
- In March 2011 Thomas broke his hand at Hill Correctional Center; Hill placed a cast and issued a low-bunk permit but removed the cast for a May 2011 transfer to Stateville and the Stateville staff did not recast him.
- X-rays through 2011–2012 showed incomplete healing; physical therapy was prescribed in December 2011 but provided only from October–December 2012.
- Dr. Saleh Obaisi became Stateville medical director in Nov. 2013; Thomas requested renewal of his low-bunk permit and referral to an orthopedist in Oct. 2014 and again in Jan. 2015 (grievance filed). Obaisi did not act until June 25, 2015.
- UIC orthopedist ultimately saw Thomas in Nov. 2015 and reported nerve damage and healing abnormalities, noting earlier proper treatment might have avoided complications.
- Thomas also has chronic BPH treated with tamsulosin (Flomax); he contends Flomax was ineffective but doctors (including Drs. Obaisi and Martija) continued it.
- The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants; the Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Dr. Martija and Wexford but reversed and remanded as to Dr. Obaisi (Estate) on hand-related claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deliberate indifference for hand injury (low-bunk permit delay) against Obaisi | Obaisi knew of persistent pain and permit requests (Oct. 2014, Jan. 2015 grievance) but delayed renewal for months, exposing Thomas to pain/risks | Obaisi's notes do not show earlier knowledge; Thomas may not have needed the permit; ambiguity supports summary judgment | Reversed as to Obaisi on hand permit: triable factual dispute whether Obaisi knew and needlessly delayed (remanded) |
| Deliberate indifference for hand injury (specialist referral) against Obaisi | Obaisi delayed initiating referral for months despite grievances and requests, and delay plausibly exacerbated injury/nerve damage | Delay may be due to UIC scheduling or other non-actionable administrative causes; orthopedist said damage may be from original break | Reversed as to Obaisi on specialist-referral delay: jury could find deliberate indifference because delay before June 2015 is attributable to Obaisi |
| Prostate treatment (continuing Flomax) against Obaisi | Continuing Flomax despite records showing it was ineffective amounts to deliberate indifference | Flomax is an accepted treatment; no evidence Obaisi subjectively knew it was ineffective for Thomas | Affirmed for Obaisi on prostate claim: no reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference for continuing Flomax |
| Liability of Dr. Martija and Wexford (Monell) | Martija failed to timely renew permit and continued ineffective Flomax; Wexford has policies/customs causing poor care and no transfer coordination | Martija renewed permit when first shown to have notice; she and others reasonably maintained Flomax; single transfer lapse and no evidence of policy/custom or final policymaking for Wexford | Affirmed for Martija and Wexford: no evidence of deliberate indifference by Martija or Monell liability for Wexford |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment requires adequate medical care for prisoners and forbids punishment by withholding it)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference standard: subjective awareness of substantial risk)
- Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (Eighth Amendment standards applied to prison medical-delays and seriousness inquiry)
- Davis v. Kayira, 938 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2019) (evidence of risk obviousness, persistence in ineffective treatment, or radical departure from professional judgment supports jury inference of deliberate indifference)
- Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2020) (short delays in specialist referrals can support deliberate indifference)
- Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015) (even multi-day delays may be actionable)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal/corporate liability requires policy, custom, or final policymaker)
- Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2017) (Monell analysis for prison health-care contractors; omission can be a policy)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; draw factual inferences in favor of nonmovant)