145 A.3d 1014
D.C.2016Background
- Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder while armed (a plea to a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder) after a Rule 11 colloquy and factual proffer; sentencing was set.
- About ten days before sentencing (nearly two months after the plea), appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting innocence but not attacking the Rule 11 process.
- The trial court granted the withdrawal without holding an evidentiary hearing or conducting a factual inquiry; the government moved for reconsideration and for an evidentiary hearing.
- The government proffered jailhouse phone calls showing appellant learned a key witness was dead and that appellant’s motive for withdrawing was to avoid the negotiated sentence; the court then scheduled evidentiary hearings.
- After hearings and consideration of factors (timing, prejudice, counsel competence, fairness), the trial court vacated its earlier withdrawal order, reinstated the guilty plea, and sentenced appellant per the plea agreement.
- Appellant appealed, arguing the withdrawal order was irrevocable; the court affirmed, relying principally on the Third Circuit’s United States v. Jerry doctrine and the Superior Court’s inherent authority to revisit interlocutory orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may reconsider an order granting withdrawal of a guilty plea | The trial court lacked authority; once it granted withdrawal the order was irrevocable | The order was interlocutory; the court retains authority to reconsider while it has jurisdiction | Court held trial court may reconsider interlocutory withdrawal orders under its inherent authority (adopting Jerry) |
| Whether Kercheval/Heim/Double Jeopardy bar reconsideration | Kercheval/Heim protect defendant from use of plea statements and require finality | Government: those cases do not render a premature withdrawal order equivalent to an acquittal | Court held Kercheval/Heim (and Double Jeopardy) do not prohibit reconsideration because withdrawal orders are interlocutory, not final acquittals |
| Whether reconsideration was procedurally permissible under D.C. rules | Rule 11 & 32(e) do not expressly permit reconsideration, so reconsideration was improper | Superior Court has general/inherent powers; Rule 57(b) analog supports proceeding when rules are silent | Court held no procedural bar: Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(b) and inherent powers permit reconsideration when consonant with justice |
| Whether reconsideration was justified on these facts | Appellant: court already ruled; government already responded; grant should stand | Government: new evidence (jail calls), delay, motive to manipulate plea process justify reconsideration | Court found reconsideration consonant with justice given lack of factual inquiry, new proffered evidence, delay and manipulative motive; reinstated plea |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973) (district court has inherent authority to reconsider interlocutory orders allowing plea withdrawal)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (recognizing inherent powers of courts to manage proceedings and sanction to achieve orderly disposition)
- Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927) (statements during plea colloquy cannot be used against defendant if plea is withdrawn)
- Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (final acquittal divests court of jurisdiction; distinguishes final acquittal from interlocutory orders)
- Francis v. United States, 715 A.2d 894 (D.C. 1998) (discussing Superior Court’s general/inherent powers)
- Bennett v. United States, 726 A.2d 156 (D.C. 1999) (factors and inquiry a trial court should consider before permitting plea withdrawal)
- United States v. Farrah, 715 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1983) (adopting Jerry to permit reconsideration and reinstatement of plea)