Michael Stansell v.
828 F.3d 412
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Michael Stansell pleaded guilty in 1998 to multiple sex offenses and was sentenced to 20 years to life; his initial federal habeas petition was denied in 2002.
- In 2013–2014 Stansell sought state relief; the Ohio court of appeals held the trial court erred by failing to impose statutorily required post-release control and remanded for imposition of that term.
- The trial court imposed a five-year term of post-release control in 2014 and later issued a nunc pro tunc clerical correction in 2015 concerning court costs.
- Stansell filed in the Sixth Circuit for authorization to file a “second or successive” habeas petition in federal district court, reasserting a due-process challenge he had raised earlier to his original sexually violent predator classification.
- The central question was whether the 2014 partial resentencing (adding post-release control) produced a new “judgment” such that Stansell’s filing would not be “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether imposition of post-release control in 2014 created a new judgment for § 2244(b) purposes | Stansell: the resentencing created a new judgment and therefore his petition is not second or successive | State: only a full resentencing creates a new judgment; a partial correction is not enough | Court: New custodial term (prison + post-release control) is a new judgment; petition is not second or successive |
| Whether the court should apply a claim-by-claim or judgment-based test to determine successive status | Stansell: judgment-based approach allows relitigation of claims after intervening judgment | State: adopt claim-by-claim approach (or require full resentencing) so prior claims remain barred | Court: follows Magwood — the test is judgment-focused; do not split application by claim |
| Whether adding post-release control is a mere technical/corrective change (not creating new judgment) | Stansell: implicitly treats the change as substantive (new judgment) | State: frames the change as ministerial or clerical (no new judgment) | Court: substantive—post-release control imposes significant restraints and alters the sentence; it creates a new judgment |
| Whether the 2015 nunc pro tunc journal entry constituted a separate new judgment | Stansell: characterizes the nunc pro tunc entry as a resentencing/new judgment | State: the entry corrected clerical error and did not create a new judgment | Court: nunc pro tunc correction is not a new judgment; it merely fixed the record and should not reset successive rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (§ 2244(b) “second or successive” inquiry is judgment-focused)
- King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 2015) (applies Magwood to resentencing that altered sentence and treats entire application as challenging new judgment)
- Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937) (sentence constitutes the criminal judgment)
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (discusses finality of sentence in habeas context)
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (defines “in custody” to include significant post-release restraints)
- Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (AEDPA limits on successive petitions)