Michael Sockwell v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, 141 F.4th 1231

Background

Michael Sockwell was convicted of capital murder for pecuniary gain in Alabama and sentenced to death.
Sockwell challenged his conviction via a federal habeas petition, alleging that the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes against Black jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause under Batson v. Kentucky.
At trial, prosecutor Ellen Brooks struck 8 of 10 qualified Black jurors compared to 7 of 32 white jurors, with a specific focus on the exclusion of Eric Davis, a Black male whom Brooks described as similar to the defendant in race, sex, and age.
Brooks provided supposedly race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike (vagueness about pretrial publicity, views on death penalty), but statistical disparities and historical patterns of discrimination were highlighted.
The state courts upheld Sockwell’s conviction, finding no Batson violation; the federal district court did the same, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the state courts had unreasonably applied federal law, especially in failing to consider all relevant circumstances.
The Eleventh Circuit ordered habeas relief, conditioned on Alabama’s right to retry Sockwell, citing overwhelming evidence of purposeful discrimination and a pattern of Batson violations by the prosecutor.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the peremptory strike of Eric Davis was racially discriminatory under Batson	Brooks’ explanation was pretextual, with explicit racial comparison, disproportionate strikes against Black jurors, and a well-documented history of prosecutorial Batson violations	Brooks gave race-neutral reasons; differences in venire answers; past reversals not dispositive; state courts considered all relevant Batson steps	The Eleventh Circuit held the strike was racially discriminatory, reversing the district court, as no reasonable jurist could ignore the evidence
Whether the Alabama Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law (Batson’s third step)	State court failed to explicitly or adequately consider all relevant circumstances (history, statistics, comparative juror analysis, prosecutor’s statements)	State court considered all relevant circumstances; not required to list all in its opinion; deference owed under AEDPA	The Eleventh Circuit found the state court unreasonably applied Batson; considered insufficiently the totality of circumstances
Relevance of prosecutor’s prior Batson violations in considering discriminatory intent	Prior cases involving the same prosecutor show a clear, relevant pattern of racial discrimination in jury selection	Prior violations contextually distinct, outside governing law for some trials, not necessarily probative in this case	The court found the history of repeated Batson violations by Brooks was a key relevant circumstance supporting discrimination
Applicability of harmless error review to Batson claims on habeas	Even one discriminatory strike warrants relief; Batson violations are structural errors not subject to harmless error analysis	Relief should require a showing that law and justice require it, potentially via harmless error review	The court declined to apply harmless error review, consistent with past circuit and Supreme Court decisions

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (establishes three-step framework prohibiting racially motivated peremptory strikes)
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (U.S. 2019) (discusses importance of considering relevant history and patterns in Batson analysis)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (U.S. 2005) (comparative juror analysis and pretext in Batson claims)
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2005) (Batson's burden-shifting structure and review of purposefulness)
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (U.S. 1995) (explains low burden at Batson's second step for race-neutral reasons)
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1991) (evaluates race-neutral explanations in Batson analysis)