Michael Sean Mullenix v. Jennifer Mayberry, 662 S.W.3d 691

This case arises from a paternity/modification action: Mullenix filed a petition (July 21, 2020) to modify custody, visitation, and support of a minor child; a 2008 consent order had governed these matters earlier.
On December 27, 2021, the circuit court denied Mullenix’s requested changes to custody and visitation but modified child support in Mayberry’s favor.
On January 9, 2022 (13 days after the judgment), Mayberry filed a Rule 54(e) motion for attorney’s fees with a billing record and served the motion via the court’s electronic filing system on Mullenix’s attorney only (not on Mullenix personally).
Mullenix moved to dismiss the fee motion under Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(e) and 5(b)(1), arguing that after a final judgment in an action where the court retains jurisdiction, service must be made on the party personally.
The circuit court granted Mayberry’s fee motion (awarding $10,000) and denied the dismissal motion without explanation; Mullenix appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mayberry)	Defendant's Argument (Mullenix)	Held
Whether service of a Rule 54(e) fee motion on opposing counsel via e-filing satisfied service requirements when a final judgment had been entered and the court retained jurisdiction	The December 27 order was not final because fees were tried by consent; alternatively, Rule 54(e) does not require personal service on the party and serving counsel satisfies the rule’s purpose of informing the opponent before appeal	Rule 54(e) requires filing and service within 14 days, and Rule 5(b)(1) mandates service on the party (not counsel) when a final judgment has been entered and the court retains jurisdiction; failure to personally serve the party requires dismissal	Reversed: the December 27 order was final, domestic-relations courts retain continuing jurisdiction, and Rule 5(b)(1) required personal service on Mullenix; service on counsel only was insufficient
Whether actual notice, consent at the hearing, or the court’s inherent authority to award fees cures defective service	Actual notice / prior trial of fees and the court’s inherent power justify the award despite defective service	Defective service cannot be cured by actual notice or convenience; Rule 5(b)(1) controls and must be followed	Rejected: actual notice and the court’s inherent authority do not excuse noncompliance with the plain service requirement of Rule 5(b)(1) when a final judgment and continuing jurisdiction exist

State ex rel. Rutledge v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 624 S.W.3d 106 (2021 Ark. 133) (rule-construction reviewed de novo)
Connally v. Connally, 233 S.W.3d 168 (95 Ark. App. 2006) (post-judgment papers in actions with continuing jurisdiction must be served on the party personally)
Midwest Terminals of Toledo, Inc. v. Palm, 378 S.W.3d 761 (2011 Ark. 81) (attorney’s-fee awards are collateral and do not affect finality of the merits judgment)
Brown v. State, 292 S.W.3d 288 (375 Ark. 2009) (when language of rule/statute is plain, give words their ordinary meaning)
Brock v. Townsell, 309 S.W.3d 179 (2009 Ark. 224) (avoid literal constructions that produce absurd results)
Hargis v. Hargis, 587 S.W.3d 208 (2019 Ark. 321) (circuit court has inherent power to award fees in domestic-relations matters)
Wilson v. Wilson, 487 S.W.3d 420 (2016 Ark. App. 191) (circuit courts retain continuing jurisdiction in domestic-relations cases)