Michael Scroggins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
39A01-1605-PC-1026
| Ind. Ct. App. | Feb 28, 2017Background
- On Dec. 20, 2011 Michael Scroggins pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to two counts of reckless homicide and one count of criminal recklessness (all Class C felonies); the trial court sentenced him to consecutive eight-year terms for an aggregate 24-year prison term.
- Before pleading, the State had threatened to amend charges to add multiple felony counts (including OWI causing death and drug-dealing counts) and an HSO allegation, exposing Scroggins to a much larger potential sentencing range.
- Scroggins later filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and an involuntary plea, claiming counsel misadvised him about maximum exposure and failed to raise double jeopardy/Proportionality Clause arguments and other defenses.
- The post-conviction court denied relief; Scroggins appealed the denial, arguing counsel’s alleged erroneous advice as to penal consequences prejudiced his decision to plead guilty.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed under the Strickland/Segura framework for guilty-plea ineffective-assistance claims, focusing on whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether the hypothetical reasonable defendant would have gone to trial if properly advised.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Scroggins) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to advise that double jeopardy or Indiana’s Proportionality Clause would preclude/mitigate certain potential counts, reducing maximum exposure | Counsel failed to advise that certain counts would not stand, so Scroggins overestimated his exposure and would not have pled | Even assuming deficiency, Scroggins cannot show prejudice because plea avoided a much longer exposure and record lacks credible evidence he would have gone to trial | Denied relief — no proven prejudice; plea provided substantial benefit |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for misinforming about the maximum sentence faced if tried (i.e., 102 yrs vs. 72 yrs) | Counsel’s erroneous advice about sentencing range induced an involuntary plea | Sentencing exposure fluctuated due to many pending/amendable counts and open plea; Scroggins received concrete benefit (24 yrs) and record does not establish a reasonable defendant would have risked trial | Denied relief — no showing the hypothetical reasonable defendant would have gone to trial |
| Whether counsel should have timely challenged appointment of special judge | Failure to timely challenge judge caused prejudice because a different judge might have been more lenient | No evidence of bias or that a different judge would have imposed a lesser sentence | Denied relief — no evidence of prejudice |
| Whether counsel failed to advise that the State lacked sufficient evidence on certain OWI-causing-death counts | Had counsel advised, Scroggins would have gone to trial and maybe been acquitted on those counts | Even acquittal on those counts would not eliminate exposure from remaining serious charges; duplicative claim of penal-consequence advice | Denied relief — no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 500 (Ind. 2001) (framework for guilty-plea ineffective-assistance and materiality of erroneous penal advice)
- Manzano v. State, 12 N.E.3d 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (distinguishes types of Segura claims: overlooked defenses vs. incorrect advisements of penal consequences)
- Willoughby v. State, 792 N.E.2d 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (appellate standard for reviewing post-conviction denials; no reweighing credibility)