Michael Scott Carroll, II v. State
352 P.3d 251
Wyo.2015Background
- Michael Carroll II was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor based on conduct toward his stepdaughter T.T. that began when she was 14.
- In 2009 Carroll had pled guilty in Colorado to third-degree sexual abuse of a different 14‑year‑old and had been ordered to have no contact with minors; the prosecutor sought to introduce that prior conviction under W.R.E. 404(b).
- T.T. testified that Carroll progressively removed her clothing, massaged her breasts and vaginal area, and used his fingers and a sex toy to penetrate her; DNA from a sex toy was presented as evidence.
- Carroll moved under Wyoming’s rape‑shield statute (Wyo. Stat. § 6‑2‑312) to introduce evidence of T.T.’s prior sexual conduct; the court allowed limited evidence (prior handling of sex toys) but excluded evidence of other sexualized behavior with peers.
- During trial defense attacked credibility of a key witness (Miranda Trevino, T.T.’s mother); prosecutor was permitted to elicit testimony about domestic violence after the defense “opened the door.”
- Carroll appealed, raising evidentiary challenges to admission/exclusion of the prior conviction, rape‑shield rulings, admission of domestic‑violence evidence, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct; the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior conviction under W.R.E. 404(b) | Prior conviction was improper propensity evidence and unduly prejudicial | Prior conviction was admissible to show intent, motive, plan, course of conduct and absence of mistake; probative value outweighed prejudice | Admission upheld: trial court did not abuse discretion; 404(b) purposes satisfied and probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice |
| Prosecutor referring to prior conviction during witness questioning | References to prior conviction were improper and prejudicial | References were permissible because the conviction had been properly admitted | No plain error: references were allowed given admissibility and no clear rule violation |
| Admission of victim’s prior sexual conduct (rape‑shield, § 6‑2‑312) | Defense sought to show victim’s sexual knowledge/experimentation to counter claim of naivete | State argued rape‑shield bars exploring unrelated prior sexual conduct; only narrowly relevant evidence should be admitted | Court affirmed exclusion of evidence of sexualized conduct with peers; limited evidence of prior handling of sex toys allowed as alternative DNA explanation |
| Admission of domestic‑violence evidence after credibility attack | Domestic‑violence testimony was irrelevant and improperly prejudicial | Defense opened the door by impeaching witness; domestic‑violence evidence was relevant to explain witness’s inconsistent statements | Admission upheld: not an abuse of discretion because it bolstered credibility after attack on witness |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument | Several prosecutor statements were improper (personal belief, conflating evidence, disparaging defense) | Statements were within permissible inferences, accurately reflected testimony, and not personal attacks | No plain error: remarks viewed in context were permissible and did not create substantial risk of miscarriage of justice |
Key Cases Cited
- Gleason v. State, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002) (404(b) analysis and prejudice balancing)
- Mersereau v. State, 286 P.3d 97 (Wyo. 2012) (standards for admitting other‑acts evidence)
- Budig v. State, 222 P.3d 148 (Wyo. 2010) (application of rape‑shield statute to exclude victim’s unrelated sexual history)
- Trujillo v. State, 44 P.3d 22 (Wyo. 2002) (limits on prosecutor argument; ABA standards)
- Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1992) (review of closing argument in context; harmless‑error standard)
- Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150 (Wyo. 1978) (improper prosecutor attacks on defense counsel)