226 A.3d 1288
R.I.2020Background
- The McElroys own a parcel (formerly part of the 1929 “Davis Heritage”) that is set back from Seaweed Beach and separated from the beach by three neighboring lots now owned by the Stephenses, the Anthonys, and Lacroix.
- In 1929 the original contiguous Davis Heritage parcels were granted a beach easement over Seaweed Beach to access the ocean.
- The McElroys bought their parcel in 1986; the recorded purchase-and-sale agreement referenced rights to cross the Dareliuses’ lands to access the water, but the 1986 warranty deed did not expressly restate that language and instead referenced easements of record.
- In 2013 the Stephenses physically blocked a driveway the McElroys had used for decades, triggering this suit to quiet title to the access easement, a declaration of right to use a right-of-way across defendants’ properties, and injunctive relief.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the McElroys, concluding the appurtenant easement survived transfers and entitled them to unobstructed access; defendants appealed.
- The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for trial, holding genuine issues of material fact remain—particularly whether implied easements or easements by necessity exist and whether any such easement was created by the 1929 grant or by the 1986 conveyance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did an easement appurtenant to the original Davis Heritage survive transfers and entitle McElroys to access Seaweed Beach? | McElroy: an appurtenant easement passes with the dominant tenement even if not mentioned; the recorded agreement/deeds preserve that right. | Defendants: the McElroy parcel no longer abuts the beach, so the original access easement cannot be enjoyed; it was not expressly reserved in the 1986 deed. | Court: Not decided on SJ. Survival of the original easement is disputed and depends on additional factual/legal inquiry; SJ was premature. |
| Do plaintiffs have a right-of-way across defendants’ parcels by implied easement? | McElroy: implied easement (or easement by necessity) arises from prior unity and the manner of use at subdivision. | Defendants: no implied easement exists; factual prerequisites (e.g., severance of title, apparent continuous use) are lacking. | Court: Existence of an implied easement is a factual question unsuitable for summary judgment and must be resolved at trial. |
| Did an easement by necessity arise at subdivision or via the 1986 deed? | McElroy: necessity or existing use at the time of conveyances created a right to cross neighboring parcels. | Defendants: no necessity or unity facts established to create such an easement tied to McElroy’s parcel. | Court: Whether an easement by necessity was created at subdivision or in 1986 requires factfinding; remand for trial. |
| Was summary judgment appropriate on the competing easement theories? | McElroy: yes; appurtenant easement law allows disposition on the record. | Defendants: no; implied/necessity theories require evidentiary development. | Court: SJ improper as genuine issues of material fact remain; vacated and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sullivan Granite Co. v. Vuono, 48 R.I. 292, 137 A. 687 (R.I. 1927) (discusses transmission and extinction of appurtenant easements)
- Crawford Realty Co. v. Ostrow, 89 R.I. 12, 150 A.2d 5 (R.I. 1959) (addresses passage of easements with dominant tenement absent express exclusion)
- Caluori v. Dexter Credit Union, 79 A.3d 823 (R.I. 2013) (addresses standards and factual inquiry for implied easements)
- Note Capital Group, Inc. v. Perretta, 207 A.3d 998 (R.I. 2019) (summarizes de novo appellate review and summary-judgment principles)