Michael Pendleton v.
732 F.3d 280
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Petitioners Corey Grant, Franklin X. Baines, and Michael J. Pendleton each claim they are serving mandatory life-without-parole sentences for crimes committed as juveniles and seek authorization to file successive habeas petitions raising Miller v. Alabama claims.
- Baines and Pendleton were convicted in Pennsylvania state court (seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Grant was convicted in federal court in New Jersey (seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
- Under AEDPA, a petitioner must obtain court-of-appeals authorization before filing a second or successive habeas petition; authorization requires a prima facie showing that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court and previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); § 2255(h).
- Petitioners conceded Miller announces a new rule but disputed whether Miller is retroactive to cases on collateral review; respondents disputed retroactivity (Pennsylvania) or argued petitioners don’t meet Miller’s substantive requirements (federal government for Grant).
- The Third Circuit held that Petitioners made the required prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive, joining several other circuits that granted similar authorization, and therefore authorized filing of successive habeas petitions, while noting the grant is tentative and district courts must dismiss any unauthorized claims if the statutory requirements are not met on further review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller v. Alabama is a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review | Miller is retroactive because the Supreme Court applied its rule in Jackson v. Hobbs via state collateral review and because Miller announces a substantive rule or, alternatively, a watershed procedural rule under Teague | Pennsylvania argues Miller is not retroactive; federal government concedes retroactivity but contends Grant’s sentence complies with Miller | Court: Petitioners made a prima facie showing that Miller is retroactive; authorization to file successive petitions granted (tentative; district court to evaluate on merits) |
| Whether petitioners satisfied the prima facie statutory standard for authorization to file successive habeas petitions | Petitioners argued their claims rely on Miller, a new constitutional rule, and thus meet § 2244(b)(2)(A)/§ 2255(h)(2) threshold | Respondents argued either Miller is not retroactive or the petitioners’ sentences do not violate Miller so no authorization is warranted | Court: Prima facie showing met — authorization granted to file successive petitions for fuller district-court exploration |
| Proper scope and effect of the court-of-appeals authorization | Petitioners sought leave to litigate Miller-based relief in district court | Respondents warned that authorization should not resolve merits or substitute for district-court review | Court: Authorization is limited and tentative; it permits filing but does not resolve merits; district court must dismiss claims if statutory requirements are not met on review |
| Whether Miller constitutes a watershed procedural rule under Teague that would mandate retroactivity | Petitioners asserted Miller could be a watershed procedural rule meriting retroactivity | Respondents disputed watershed status and retroactivity | Court: Addressed as part of prima facie analysis but did not definitively decide watershed status; concluded prima facie showing of retroactivity sufficient for authorization |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding mandatory LWOP for offenders under 18 violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2469 (2012) (companion case to Miller involving state collateral review)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (distinguishing substantive rules that must be applied retroactively)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules on collateral review)
- Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2007) (prima facie showing defined as sufficient to warrant fuller district-court exploration)
- Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing standard for prima facie showing in successive-petition context)