Michael Newcomb v. Spring Creekk Cooler Inc., 926 F.3d 709

Michael Newcomb, a truck driver, was struck by a Spring Creek employee’s forklift while standing on the loading dock at Spring Creek Cooler’s facility and suffered severe head injuries rendering him disabled.
Newcomb remained on the dock to count and "pulp" crates during loading; signs on the dock warned "Restricted Area -- Forklift in Operation" and "Employees Only Past This Point." He testified he thought the restricted sign did not apply to him.
The forklift operator, Ronald Smalls, made several prior trips that did not hit Newcomb; on the fifth trip Smalls drove forward and collided with Newcomb, who attempted but failed to evade the forklift.
Newcomb sued Spring Creek and Smalls in federal court (diversity), alleging negligence by Smalls, respondeat superior liability against Spring Creek, and premises-liability/negligent-occupier theories; Spring Creek admitted respondeat superior applied in part.
The district court granted summary judgment for Spring Creek, reasoning Newcomb had equal or superior knowledge of the hazard and thus assumed the risk; the court also treated assumption of risk as a bar to recovery.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding the district court misapplied Georgia law: the equal-or-superior-knowledge rule applies to premises-liability claims, not to employer liability under respondeat superior, and assumption of risk did not defeat Newcomb’s negligence claim on summary judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the equal-or-superior-knowledge rule (premises-liability rule) bars recovery against Spring Creek for injuries caused by an employee	Newcomb argued the claim is based on active negligence by an employee (forklift operator) and thus is a respondeat superior negligence claim, not a premises-liability claim subject to the equal-or-superior-knowledge rule	Spring Creek argued Newcomb knew of the hazard (signs, his duties) so under premises-liability principles he had equal or superior knowledge and cannot recover	Court held the equal-or-superior-knowledge rule applies only to premises-liability claims; Newcomb’s respondeat superior/active-negligence claim is not barred by that rule
Whether assumption of risk bars recovery on summary judgment	Newcomb argued he did not assume the risk of being negligently struck by the forklift and did not consent to waive Spring Creek’s duty of care; his remaining on the dock after prior safe trips was not consenting to negligent acts	Spring Creek argued Newcomb voluntarily remained in a known hazardous area and thus assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law	Court held assumption of risk is a defense for the jury except in plain, undisputed cases; on this record reasonable minds could differ and summary judgment was improper

Lipham v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1994) (distinguishes premises-liability duties from employer/employee active negligence; rejects barring employer liability simply because injury occurred on premises)
Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co., 429 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (forklift-caused injury characterized as active negligence, not a premises condition)
Byrom v. Douglas Hosp., Inc., 792 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (explains distinction between premises-condition cases and employee active-negligence cases; rejects applying equal-or-superior-knowledge analysis where inappropriate)
Robinson v. Kroger Co., 493 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 1997) (explains premises-liability basis: owner’s superior knowledge of a hazardous condition)
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bryson, 225 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (assumption-of-risk does not extend to assuming the negligent act of another)
Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 257 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1979) (respondeat superior requires employee acting within scope of employment and on employer’s business)