Michael Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections
994 F.3d 1335
11th Cir.2021Background
- Michael Nance, a Georgia death-row inmate, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking an injunction against Georgia’s lethal-injection protocol and requesting execution by firing squad because of a medical condition that makes intravenous access likely to fail and cause severe pain.
- Georgia law authorizes lethal injection as the sole method of execution; Nance proposed an alternative (firing squad) not authorized by Georgia law.
- A panel of the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte raised whether Nance’s § 1983 claim necessarily challenged the validity of his sentence and therefore had to be recharacterized as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- The panel held the complaint would foreclose the State from carrying out its sentence under Georgia law, so it amounted to a habeas challenge and—because it was second or successive—was jurisdictionally barred.
- The full court denied rehearing en banc; Chief Judge Pryor (joined by two judges) issued a statement defending the panel’s jurisdictional reasoning, while three judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing the panel decision conflicts with Supreme Court and circuit precedent and may leave some prisoners without a federal remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a method-of-execution challenge that seeks an unauthorized alternative is cognizable under § 1983 or must be recharacterized as habeas | Nance: claim challenges method, not sentence validity; § 1983 is proper (Nelson, Bucklew) | Panel majority: because lethal injection is Georgia’s sole authorized method, enjoining it would imply invalidity of the sentence → habeas vehicle required | Panel: recharacterize as habeas and dismiss as second/successive; en banc rehearing denied |
| Whether pleading an alternative method not authorized by state law necessarily converts a § 1983 claim into habeas | Nance: Bucklew permits pointing to out-of-state protocols; that does not convert procedure | Panel majority: unauthorized alternative that forecloses the State’s lawfully authorized method amounts to a sentence challenge | Panel held that, given Georgia law, the requested relief would necessarily imply invalidity of the sentence |
| Whether Supreme Court and circuit precedent require treating Nance’s claim as § 1983 or habeas | Nance: Nelson, Bucklew, and later Eleventh Circuit decisions support § 1983 cognizability for method claims | Panel majority: relied on dicta in Nelson/Hill/Bucklew to justify jurisdictional dismissal; dissent says this conflicts with precedent | En banc denied; disagreement remains between panel approach and dissenting judges |
Key Cases Cited
- Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (method-of-execution claims may be brought under § 1983; challenge can sometimes amount to a sentence challenge)
- Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (an inmate may identify alternative methods not authorized by the State; state law may affect procedural vehicle)
- Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (relief that would foreclose execution may warrant habeas characterization)
- Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (Eighth Amendment framework for lethal-injection challenges)
- Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) (standards for identifying feasible, readily implemented alternatives)
- Nance v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 981 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2020) (panel held § 1983 claim recharacterized as habeas and barred; en banc rehearing denied)
- Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2016) (panel previously required alternatives be authorized by state law; later recognized as incorrect in light of Bucklew)
- Price v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging Bucklew’s correction of prior Eleventh Circuit precedent)
- McNabb v. Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 727 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2013) (discussing distinctions between § 1983 method claims and habeas)
- Tompkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 557 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2009) (same)
- Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750 (11th Cir. 2006) (contrast between habeas petitions and § 1983 complaints)
