Michael Morath, in His Official Capacity as Texas Commissioner of Education And Michael Berry, in His Official Capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Education v. Progreso Independent School District
03-16-00254-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 21, 2016Background
- Progreso ISD sued Michael Morath (Commissioner) and Michael Berry (Deputy Commissioner) after the TEA imposed sanctions including a board of managers following a Special Accreditation Investigation (SAI) and a multi-year management-team oversight.
- The management team had been in place for two academic years and produced quarterly reports and management-team documents documenting governance failures.
- The District obtained a temporary injunction; the State appealed. This document is the State’s reply brief arguing the injunction and the District’s ultra vires claim lack merit.
- Central statutory provisions: Tex. Educ. Code §§ 39.057, 39.102, 39.111 and implementing TEA rules (e.g., 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 97.1059) govern SAIs, sanctions, and the Commissioner’s discretion.
- Key contested legal points: whether the Commissioner’s SAI-based sanctions are judicially reviewable via an ultra vires claim; whether the management team’s two-year tenure or the SAI materials validly triggered sanctions; and whether alleged procedural irregularities (routing-sheet initials, notice, internal procedures) void the actions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held (Appellants' position / relief sought) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether the Commissioner’s SAI and sanctions are subject to common-law (ultra vires) judicial review | Progreso: procedural defects and absence of required paperwork mean the Commissioner acted ultra vires and actions are void | Morath: Education Code and TEA rules grant the Commissioner plenary discretion; administrative finality and lack of statutory review foreclose ultra vires relief | Appellants: No ultra vires jurisdiction; injunction should be vacated and case dismissed |
| 2. Whether the management team’s two-year tenure triggers §39.102(b) (authorization for harsher sanctions) | Progreso: Commissioner failed to satisfy internal review/formalities (e.g., routing-sheet initials), so tenure did not properly trigger sanctions | Morath: Two full academic years in place satisfy §39.102(b); no statute requires initials or a particular routing-sheet form | Appellants: Tenure triggered §39.102(b); routing-sheet issue is immaterial |
| 3. Whether alleged procedural defects (notice, application of a “Special Investigation Procedures” document, lack of preliminary report detail) invalidate the SAI/sanctions | Progreso: Deviations from internal procedures and certain notice/formalities render SAI unlawful and sanctions void | Morath: The cited document did not govern SAIs; statutory notice requirements and administrative review opportunities were satisfied in substance; procedural flaws do not create an ultra vires claim | Appellants: No controlling procedural requirements were violated; any technical irregularity does not permit collateral ultra vires attack |
| 4. Whether TEA finality provisions and precedent bar the requested relief (retrospective or prospective injunction) | Progreso: Relief is prospective (prevent board of managers taking office) and thus permissible | Morath: Finality clauses and Texas precedent (avoid retroactive common-law review) bar injunctions that would effectively undo final administrative action | Appellants: Finality and controlling precedent preclude the injunction; relief sought is dismissal and vacatur of injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires jurisdictional test and limits on common-law judicial review)
- Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2001) (no general right to judicial review of administrative orders)
- Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997) (discussion of declaratory relief and agency action)
- Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) (retroactivity/due-course-of-law and vested-rights analysis)
- Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994) (when a plurality opinion does not control; Marks/York analysis)
- Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (framework for controlling rationale from fragmented Supreme Court decisions)
- Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2016) (discussion of limited discretionary grants and ultra vires implications)