499 S.W.3d 820
Tex.2016Background
- The McIntyres, homeschooling parents in El Paso, were criminally charged (2007) after refusing to sign the school district’s homeschool verification form; charges were later dismissed.
- They sued the district and an attendance officer claiming violations of due process, equal protection, free exercise, and privacy under Texas and U.S. Constitutions and sought declaratory, injunctive relief and § 1983 damages.
- The district moved to dismiss, arguing plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a); the attendance officer also asserted qualified immunity.
- The trial court denied jurisdictional pleas; on interlocutory appeal the court of appeals dismissed some state-law claims for failure to exhaust and dismissed federal claims against the officer on qualified immunity grounds.
- The Texas Supreme Court held the Education Code’s exhaustion requirement is limited to grievances ‘‘by’’ Titles 1 and 2 (the school laws) or a school board’s violation of them; the McIntyres’ claims challenged district action as violating constitutional rights, not the school laws themselves, so exhaustion was not required.
- The Court affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 substantive due process claim against the attendance officer based on qualified immunity (no clearly established federal right to be free from malicious prosecution unsupported by probable cause in this context).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McIntyre) | Defendant's Argument (EPISD/Mendoza) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a) requires exhaustion of administrative remedies for McIntyres’ claims | Their claims are constitutional and thus not within Commissioner jurisdiction; exhaustion not required | Claims ‘‘involve’’ school laws and are effectively challenges to district action under the Education Code, so Commissioner review/exhaustion required | Held: Exhaustion required only when aggrieved "by" the school laws or a board's violation of them; McIntyres challenged district conduct as violating constitutional rights, not the school laws themselves — exhaustion not required |
| Whether being homeschoolers exempts plaintiffs from exhaustion | Homeschool status places them outside Titles 1–2 so § 7.057(a) exhaustion does not apply | Exhaustion depends on nature of claim, not claimant identity; homeschoolers still must exhaust if aggrieved by school laws | Held: Exhaustion depends on the nature of the claim, not claimant identity; homeschool status alone does not excuse exhaustion, but here claims were not school-law grievances |
| Whether claims that district acted "pursuant to" school laws nonetheless require exhaustion | Plaintiffs: acting pursuant to the school laws does not convert constitutional grievances into school-law grievances | Defendants: actions taken pursuant to Education Code mean Commissioner has primary jurisdiction and exhaustion is required | Held: The statute does not require exhaustion for all acts taken pursuant to school laws; only when the person is aggrieved by the school laws or a board’s violation of them |
| Whether attendance officer is entitled to qualified immunity for McIntyres’ § 1983 due process claim | Plaintiffs: officer knowingly swore to criminal conduct and thus violated clearly established Fourteenth Amendment rights | Officer: no clearly established federal right to be free from prosecution unsupported by probable cause; qualified immunity applies | Held: Qualified immunity affirmed — under Fifth Circuit precedent no clearly established substantive due-process right to be free from malicious prosecution unsupported by probable cause in this context |
Key Cases Cited
- Leeper v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) (holds bona fide homeschools qualify as "private schools" for attendance-exemption purposes)
- Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2016) (exhaustion required when claims are predicated on matters within Commissioner’s exclusive jurisdiction)
- Warren v. Sanger Indep. Sch. Dist., 288 S.W. 159 (Tex. 1926) (historic rule requiring resort to school authorities before courts for matters properly belonging to administration of school laws)
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Student First Amendment speech standard; distinguishes constitutional claims from administrative-authority disputes)
- Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (U.S. 2014) (qualified-immunity framework requires a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right)
- Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808 (5th Cir. 2010) (Fifth Circuit precedent that no clearly established Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest exists to be free from criminal prosecution unsupported by probable cause)