245 So. 3d 643
Fla.2018Background
- Michael Levandoski pleaded nolo contendere in 2010 to lewd computer solicitation and traveling to meet a minor; the court sentenced him to prison followed by "sex offender probation."
- At sentencing the court orally imposed a general condition of "sex offender probation," and specifically prohibited internet access and related electronic communications; the written order included the full list of conditions in section 948.30.
- After release, Levandoski moved to strike the section 948.30 conditions, arguing they were illegal because the trial court did not orally pronounce each statutory "sex offender probation" condition and he was not convicted of one of the statute's enumerated offenses.
- The Fourth District upheld the sentence, holding that orally imposing "sex offender probation" sufficed to impose the statutory components; it certified conflict with the First District's Snow decision which required oral pronouncement of each special condition.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review, concluded Levandoski failed to show he lacked timely receipt of the written order (so he could have filed a rule 3.800(b) motion), and held that in this case due process was satisfied because Levandoski requested sex offender probation and the court referenced a condition unique to section 948.30.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court must orally pronounce each condition in §948.30 when defendant not convicted of enumerated offenses | Levandoski: each special condition must be specifically pronounced; unpronounced conditions are illegal | State/Fourth Dist.: orally imposing "sex offender probation" (plus specific references) notifies defendant; court need not list each item | The Court approved Fourth District: not required here; oral reference to "sex offender probation" plus context satisfied due process |
| Whether failure to orally pronounce creates a due process violation if defendant could have filed rule 3.800(b) | Levandoski: lack of oral pronouncement denied notice and opportunity to object | State: rule 3.800(b) permits post‑sentencing objection when written order is received, curing due process concern | Held: defendant must show he did not receive written order in time to file rule 3.800(b); Levandoski did not show that |
| Whether conditions in §948.30 are mandatory only for enumerated offenses and can be imposed as special conditions otherwise | Levandoski: conditions not mandatory for his offenses and thus are special conditions requiring oral pronouncement | State: conditions are mandatory only for enumerated offenses but may be imposed as special conditions if related to rehabilitation; oral umbrella term suffices | Held: §948.30 conditions mandatory for enumerated crimes; for other crimes they may be imposed as special conditions but court’s pronouncement here was sufficient |
| Remedy when written order is more severe than oral sentence | Levandoski: written inclusion of §948.30 made sentence illegal | State: such discrepancies can be raised via rule 3.800(a) as double jeopardy issue | Held: defendant may raise double jeopardy/over‑severity in 3.800(a) at any time; but due process objection requires showing untimely receipt of written order for 3.800(b) |
Key Cases Cited
- Norvil v. State, 191 So.3d 406 (de novo review of pure question of law)
- Lawson v. State, 969 So.2d 222 (special probation conditions generally must be orally pronounced)
- Williams v. State, 712 So.2d 762 (distinguishing general and special conditions; oral pronouncement requirement)
- Hart v. State, 668 So.2d 589 (constructive notice for general conditions in statute or rule)
- Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123 (unannounced special conditions must be stricken and not reimposed)
- Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89 (rule 3.800(b) amendments provide post‑sentencing mechanism to object to unpronounced conditions)
- State v. Shelley, 176 So.3d 914 (double jeopardy principles relevant to related solicitation/traveling offenses)
- Villanueva v. State, 200 So.3d 47 (§948.30 conditions may be imposed on nonenumerated offenses as special conditions if reasonably related to rehabilitation)