Michael L. Harris v. State of Indiana
985 N.E.2d 767
Ind. Ct. App.2013Background
- Harris was convicted in 1999 of Class B felony child molestation and later classified as a sexually violent predator, subjecting him to lifetime registry and reporting requirements.
- He initially registered in 2008 but left blank several online identifiers on the form; the form warned that disclosure of certain online identifiers could be a Class A misdemeanor for first offense and Class D for subsequent offenses.
- Detective Holloman investigated Harris in 2009 after learning of a MySpace profile and AOL email accounts connected to Harris; records showed multiple screen names tied to Harris, MySpace and AOL accounts, and the accounts were paid for by Harris’s wife using her credit card.
- Harris was charged on November 9, 2009 with failure to register as a sex offender (Class D felony) and a sex offender internet offense (Class A misdemeanor) under I.C. §§ 11-8-8-17 and 35-42-4-12.
- On May 26, 2010, he filed a petition for retroactive relief from application of INSORA provisions; the trial court denied relief in 2010, and a 2012 jury trial resulted in convictions on both counts.
- Harris received a three-year sentence on Count I and a concurrent one-year sentence on Count II; he appeals raising First Amendment and Indiana Constitution challenges and sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Amendment challenge to I.C. § 11-8-8-8 and § 35-42-4-12 | Harris argues both statutes burden anonymous and/or expressive activity online. | State contends the statutes are content-neutral and narrowly tailored to public safety. | I.C. § 11-8-8-8(a)(7) upheld; I.C. § 35-42-4-12 unconstitutional as applied to Harris. |
| Indiana Free Expression claim under Article 1, Section 9 | Registration of email/address identifiers restricts expressive activity. | Registration serves public safety and does not suppress expression. | I.C. § 11-8-8-8(a)(7) not unconstitutional as applied under Indiana Free Expression. |
| Ex Post Facto (Indiana Constitution) | Statute imposes retroactive punishment on Harris. | No detailed analysis under intent-effects test; claims insufficiently argued. | Harris waived ex post facto claim. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for failure to register (I.C. § 11-8-8-17) | He did not personally use unregistered identifiers; they were tied to his wife/business. | Evidence showed Harris used or intended to use the identifiers; omit/assignment still proves failure to register. | Sufficiency found; jury could infer use/intent to use unregistered emails/usernames. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (content-neutral regulation test and tailoring)
- Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (governmental interest and narrowly tailored analysis)
- Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2010) (content-neutral registry law not chilling on anonymity)
- Doe v. Marion County Prosecutor, 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013) (I.C. § 35-42-4-12 not narrowly tailored; analysis under Ward)
- Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (littering analogies; bans on broad expressive activity scrutinized)
- Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door solicitations and alternatives to prohibition)
- City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (administrability considerations for regulations)
- Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (complete bans require targeted evils; narrowly tailored concept)
- Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 2011) (Indiana Supreme Court on INSORA interpretation)