Michael Kissell v. Laurel Highlands SCI
670 F. App'x 766
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Pro se plaintiff Michael Francis Kissell filed a complaint in March 2015 asserting Title VII claims, referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and challenging portions of a 1997 judgment; initial complaint was dismissed but Title VII claims were remanded by this Court.
- On remand Kissell amended to assert Title VII claims and a § 1983 claim against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (D.O.C.) and the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officer Association (P.S.C.O.A.).
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); the Magistrate Judge issued two reports recommending dismissal with prejudice as amendment would be futile and inequitable.
- Kissell filed objections seeking appointment of counsel and, in the second set, leave to add a § 1983 claim against individual officers (effectively another amendment request).
- The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations, dismissed the complaint without further leave to amend, and Kissell timely appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether amended complaint plausibly alleges Title VII retaliation | Kissell contended he engaged in protected activity and suffered adverse action tied to it | Defendants argued the complaint failed to plead adverse action or causal link | Dismissed: plaintiff failed adequately to allege adverse action or causation for retaliation |
| Whether amended complaint plausibly alleges Title VII discrimination (sex, race, disability) | Kissell asserted discrimination on those bases | Defendants said pleading was conclusory and lacked facts connecting defendants to discrimination | Dismissed: plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to state discrimination claims |
| Whether P.S.C.O.A. can be held liable under Title VII | Kissell sought relief against P.S.C.O.A. | Defendants argued only passive/associational conduct alleged, not discriminatory action | Dismissed as to P.S.C.O.A.: allegations showed only passivity, not actionable discrimination |
| Whether leave to amend should be granted | Kissell requested further leave to amend and counsel | Defendants opposed further amendment as futile and inequitable | Denied: court found further amendment futile after multiple prior opportunities |
Key Cases Cited
- Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2013) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se complaints are to be liberally construed)
- James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2012) (court disregards conclusory statements on a motion to dismiss)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth)
- Slagle v. Cty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2006) (elements of Title VII retaliation claim)
- Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2010) (standard of review for denial of leave to amend)
- Angelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 1999) (standards for union liability and participation)
- E.E.O.C. v. Pipefitters Ass'n Local Union 597, 334 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (union passivity not necessarily actionable discrimination)