Michael Kingsley v. Stan Hendrickson
744 F.3d 443
7th Cir.2014Background
- Kingsley was a pretrial detainee at Monroe County Jail in Sparta, Wisconsin in 2010 and alleged excessive force during a forced transfer involving a taser.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment; at trial only the excessive force claim against Sgt. Hendrickson and Deputy Degner proceeded, and the jury verdict favored the defendants.
- During the May 20, 2010 incident, jail staff confronted Kingsley over a paper posting, restrained him, and tasered him after he resisted commands.
- Video evidence was inconclusive on Kingsley’s resistance; there were disputed claims about head impacts and whether injuries occurred.
- The district court applied a Fourteenth Amendment due‑process framework but used an Eighth Amendment standard to evaluate the excessive force claim; Kingsley appealed asserting confusing jury instructions and an improper harm requirement.
- Kingsley argues the jury instructions improperly merged Eighth and Fourteenth standards and imposed an unnecessary recklessness/intent requirement; the court upheld the instructions and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instructions conflated Eighth and Fourteenth standards. | Kingsley contends the instruction required recklessness, mixing standards for detainees and prisoners. | Hendrickson/Degner argue the instruction correctly reflected Fourteenth Amendment due process standards with objective factors and an element of recklessness. | No reversible error; instruction adequately conveyed Fourteenth Amendment standard. |
| Whether harm was properly an element and whether the taser establishes harm. | Kingsley claims harm should not be an element; taser use should per se constitute harm. | Defendants argue harm is a permissible element and taser can satisfy it; Kingsley waived objections. | Harm element properly addressed; Kingsley waived distinct harm challenge; no reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Conor, 490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court 1989) (establishes Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard for excessive force; due process context here)
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court 1979) (pretrial detainees' rights; punishment vs. confinement; due process limits)
- Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1990) (discusses objective vs. subjective standards in detainee excessive force claims)
- Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (implements objective standard; cautions about punitive elements)
- Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasizes factors in evaluating force during disturbances; good faith vs. malicious intent)
- Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010) (discusses due process protections for pretrial detainees and force proportionality)
- Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009) (notes Fourteenth Amendment protections post Bell; comparison to Eighth Amendment)
- Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court 1986) (distinguishes negligent conduct from constitutional violation; focus on intentional conduct)
- Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (limits of due process in excessive force contexts; need for intent)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court 1989) (framework for evaluating excessive force based on reasonableness at the time)