Michael Jessup v. David Shinn, 31 F.4th 1262

In 1998, 17‑year‑old Michael Jessup kidnapped, robbed, and murdered a 79‑year‑old man; he pleaded guilty to first‑degree murder and armed robbery.
At sentencing (1999) the judge conducted an individualized hearing, heard a psychologist who emphasized Jessup’s youth and immaturity, and considered mitigating and aggravating factors.
The judge exercised discretion and imposed "natural life"—life without possibility of any form of release—after concluding Jessup was unsuitable for release.
Jessup sought post‑conviction relief under Miller v. Alabama (that juveniles must have youth considered before life‑without‑parole), arguing Arizona’s statutory scheme made parole practically unavailable so his sentence was effectively mandatory.
Arizona state courts denied relief, finding the sentencing judge had considered youth; the federal district court granted habeas relief, but the Ninth Circuit reviewed under AEDPA.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding the state court reasonably applied Miller because Jessup received the individualized sentencing Miller requires.

Issue	Jessup's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Miller required resentencing despite an individualized hearing	Miller requires resentencing because Arizona law made parole effectively unavailable, so sentence was de facto mandatory	Miller only requires that the sentencer consider youth; here judge did so and rejected release, so Miller satisfied	State court reasonably applied Miller; no resentencing required
Whether the state court’s denial was an unreasonable application of Miller under AEDPA	State courts unreasonably applied Miller; district court agreed	State courts reasonably applied Miller given the record of individualized consideration	Ninth Circuit reverses district court and finds state decision reasonable

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (juveniles cannot be automatically sentenced to life without parole; sentencer must consider youth)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively)
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (Miller does not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles are constitutionally different for sentencing)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (individualized sentencing required in capital cases)
Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011) (AEDPA review considers Supreme Court precedent as of state‑court decision)