Michael Inman v. State of Indiana
2014 Ind. LEXIS 129
| Ind. | 2014Background
- On April 9, 2010 Michael Inman was at Pedigo’s Fountain Square jewelry store; Pedigo was found shot dead in the back room shortly before 5:00 p.m. with evidence the gun was Pedigo’s Rossi .38 and rings from the store later found on Inman.
- Police recovered Pedigo’s revolver and nine rings from Inman the day after the murder; Inman gave one ring to his girlfriend and claimed he had bought the items from a person he could not identify.
- The State charged Inman with murder, felony murder (robbery), robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and alleged habitual-offender status; the trial court found aggravators proven beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Inman to life without parole (LWOP), later adding concurrent terms and a habitual-offender enhancement.
- On direct appeal Inman raised multiple challenges: constitutionality of the LWOP weighing standard; several evidentiary rulings under Evidence Rule 404(b) (reference to being a suspect, jail-call reference to a "criminal spree"); ex parte exhibit log; felony-murder jury instruction and the jury’s request for a definition of "asportation"; denial of surrebuttal; cumulative error; and appellate sentence review under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
- The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed convictions and LWOP sentence, finding (1) the statute does not require weighing to be done beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) a 404(b) reference to Inman being a suspect was error but harmless; (3) the jail-call and other alleged errors were either not prejudicial or harmless; and (4) LWOP was appropriate given facts and offender’s criminal history.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (weighing standard) | Inman: weighing of aggravators vs mitigators must be done beyond a reasonable doubt | State: statute requires only that aggravators be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; weighing is a judicial determination | Court: statute constitutional — aggravators must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but weighing need not be done under that standard (followed Ritchie) |
| Admission that Inman was a suspect in another crime (404(b)) | Inman: testimony that police sought him as a suspect invited impermissible propensity inference | State: testimony explained why police came to the apartment; limiting instruction sufficed | Court: admitting the testimony was an abuse of discretion but harmless given limiting instruction and no disclosure that the other crime was a robbery |
| Jail-call reference to a "criminal spree" (404(b)) | Inman: ambiguous statement allowed jurors to infer commission of other crimes, prejudicing him | State: if statement referred only to Pedigo events it was admissible; ambiguity undermines prejudice claim | Court: record unclear as to referent; Inman failed to show prejudice, so no reversible error |
| Exhibit log provided to judge only (ex parte) / motion for change of judge & mistrial | Inman: ex parte communication gave State an unfair roadmap and warranted change of judge or mistrial | State: log was administrative; defense had prior discovery and access to exhibits | Court: no clear error or grave peril; log was administrative and defendant had prior access; denial of motions was proper, but trial courts should avoid ex parte tendering of exhibits going forward |
| Felony-murder instruction — "continuous transaction" language and asportation | Inman: instruction allowed robbery/felony murder even if robbery elements occurred after victim’s death; jury later asked for "asportation" definition | State: robbery and murder were part of a continuous transaction akin to Krempetz | Court: last sentence of instruction was improper but harmless given overwhelming evidence and correct preceding language; providing dictionary definition of "asportation" was permissible and not prejudicial |
| Denial of surrebuttal to respond to State’s assertion Pedigo was on his knees when shot | Inman: State raised a new factual point in rebuttal and defense should have been allowed to reply | State: rebuttal responded to defense’s theory of self-defense; no new, unfair point was raised | Court: denial proper — State’s rebuttal was invited by defense argument; no right to surrebuttal here |
| Cumulative error and 7(B) sentence review | Inman: combined errors denied fair trial and LWOP is inappropriate compared to other cases | State: errors were isolated/harmless and LWOP fit the offense and offender’s record | Court: cumulative error claim fails; LWOP appropriate given heinous facts and criminal history, sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004) (aggravators as functional elements and weighing need not be done beyond reasonable doubt)
- Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. 2007) (continuous-transaction/asportation analysis in felony-murder context)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (fact-finding that increases authorized punishment must be found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (Sixth Amendment jury-trial right applies to facts increasing punishment)
- Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 2011) (jurisdiction and review standards for LWOP appeals)
- Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. 2000) (harmless-error standard)
- Tincher v. Davidson, 762 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. 2002) (trial courts assisting jurors on points of law)
- Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012) (LWOP reserved for the most heinous crimes)
- Goodman v. State, 588 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1992) (surrebuttal not allowed where State’s rebuttal was invited by defense closing)