Michael Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3851
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Hayes, an Idaho inmate at a privately run facility (ICC), alleged four instances between Dec 2010 and June 2011 where legal mail addressed to him arrived opened and resealed before delivery. He identified the senders for two incidents (Dec 28, 2010; March 2, 2011) and attached grievances and a cellmate affidavit.
- Facility grievance responses admitted one item was opened "in error," said another could not be verified, and indicated one item was from the U.S. courts (not attorney mail).
- Hayes sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming (1) First Amendment violations from opening his civil legal mail outside his presence (targeting mail-room supervisor Lisa Burke) and (2) Monell policy/custom claims against Deputy Warden Cluney, IDOC, and ICC.
- The district court dismissed the complaint at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A: it treated two incidents as non-legal or court mail and held the two remaining admitted openings were isolated incidents insufficient to state a constitutional claim; it dismissed the Monell claims as insufficient.
- Ninth Circuit (majority) reviewed de novo, held prisoners have a First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened only in their presence, reversed dismissal of Hayes’s claim against Burke as to the two properly pleaded incidents, and affirmed dismissal of Hayes’s Monell claims as waived on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the First Amendment protect a prisoner's right to be present when civil legal mail is opened? | Hayes: yes — opening clearly marked legal mail outside his presence burdens confidential attorney communications and chills speech. | Defendants: argued either the mail was not protected legal mail or isolated/clerical errors that do not state a constitutional claim. | Held: Yes. The court recognized a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened only in the inmate’s presence. |
| Were Hayes’s pleaded incidents sufficient to state a First Amendment claim against Burke? | Hayes: two incidents (Dec 28, 2010 and Mar 2, 2011) plausibly alleged opened legal mail by staff; that chilling alone suffices. | Burke/Defendants: contended incidents were isolated, at most negligent, or not clearly legal mail. | Held: Reversed as to Burke — the two incidents, as pleaded (incl. admissions in grievances), were sufficient at screening to state a claim; defendants may later assert penological justifications. |
| Is actual injury beyond the speech intrusion required to state the claim? | Hayes: no — the chilling effect is itself an injury; no further actual injury needed. | Defendants: relied on precedent distinguishing access-to-courts claims that require actual injury. | Held: No actual injury beyond the constitutional violation is required for a free-speech claim; alleged chilling suffices. |
| Were Monell policy/custom claims against Cluney, IDOC, ICC preserved and adequately pleaded? | Hayes: alleged a longstanding policy/custom of opening legal mail (esp. for sex-offense inmates). | Defendants: district court dismissed as insufficient; on appeal defendants moved to affirm. | Held: Affirmed dismissal — Hayes waived appellate challenge to Monell claims by failing to brief them in opening brief, so court declined to address merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (recognizing presence requirement to prevent reading of legal mail and protect confidential communications)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (prison regulations that burden rights are valid if reasonably related to penological interests)
- Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (censorship of inmate correspondence implicates First Amendment rights of outsiders)
- Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.) (single intentional reading of legal mail can establish Sixth Amendment injury and chilling effect)
- Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir.) (multiple improperly opened legal mail items sufficient to state a claim)
- Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir.) (policy or practice of opening legal mail outside inmate’s presence burdens free speech)
- Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing court mail from attorney mail for protection)
- Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.) (chilling effect from opening attorney mail implicates free speech)