344 So.3d 11
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2022Background
- Ultra Duster is a compressed‑gas keyboard cleaner containing 1,1‑difluoroethane (DFE) and a bitterant; Daiho manufactured it, AW distributed it, and Wal‑Mart retailed it.
- Amy Merrill, a long‑time DFE user who knew and read product warnings, purchased Ultra Duster, inhaled it while driving, lost consciousness, and caused a crash that severely injured appellant Michael Grieco.
- Grieco sued Daiho, AW, and Wal‑Mart for strict liability (design defect and failure to warn) and negligence, alleging the bitterant was inadequately dispersed and the label insufficient.
- Trial court denied two earlier summary‑judgment motions but, after the First DCA’s decision in DZE v. Vickers, a different judge granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Merrill’s voluntary impairment broke the causation chain.
- The Fourth DCA reviews de novo and affirms: (1) no design‑defect strict liability because the product was used contrary to its intended purpose; (2) warnings were adequate and known to Merrill; and (3) Merrill’s voluntary misconduct was the sole proximate cause as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strict liability — design defect | Bitterant was not uniformly dispersed, making product unreasonably dangerous and defective | Product was safe for its intended use (cleaning); misuse (inhalation) is unintended; no defect shown | Summary judgment for defendants — strict liability inapplicable where injury resulted from illegal, unintended use |
| Strict liability — failure to warn | Label and bitterant did not prevent foreseeable misuse; defendants should have done more | Label expressly warned inhalation may be harmful or fatal and disclosed bitterant; Merrill knew and ignored it | Summary judgment for defendants — warning was clear, adequate, and known to Merrill; no issue of material fact |
| Negligence / proximate cause | Defendants’ conduct (manufacture/sale) created risk that foreseeably led to crash | Merrill’s voluntary inhalation and decision to drive while impaired were independent superseding causes | Summary judgment for defendants — Merrill’s voluntary intoxication was sole proximate cause as a matter of law (relying on DZE) |
Key Cases Cited
- DZE Corp. v. Vickers, 299 So. 3d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (driver’s voluntary intoxication can be sole proximate cause as matter of law)
- High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 610 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1992) (strict liability applies only to intended uses)
- Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489 (Fla. 2015) (consumer‑expectation standard for design defects)
- McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992) (foreseeability and duty analysis in negligence)
- Horstman v. Farris, 725 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (manufacturer not liable where driver’s intentional inhalation and driving broke causation)
- Husky Indus., Inc. v. Black, 434 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (manufacturer not insurer against all misuses)