MICHAEL GLEMAN v. MWH AMERICAS, INC., 309 So.3d 681

Gleman, a county employee, was suspended then terminated; he sued the county alleging retaliation for whistleblowing and settled, executing a release that expressly preserved claims against certain third parties.
Gleman then sued contractors and individuals (MWH/Stantec, Hinterland Group, and employees) for tortious interference, alleging defendants made unjustified complaints about his job performance to the county to undermine him after he objected to improper billing.
Defendants moved to dismiss/strike the complaint as a sham and asked the court to take judicial notice of pleadings, deposition, and hearing transcripts from Gleman’s earlier suit, arguing the two suits contained irreconcilable causation statements.
The trial court found the tortious-interference pleading was a sham and a fraud on the court, dismissed the case with prejudice, and entered final judgments for defendants.
The appellate court reversed: it held the pleading was ambiguous (permitting a theory that defendants’ complaints were a pretext or cover for the county’s retaliatory firing), and defendants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the complaint was palpably false or that Gleman had engaged in an unconscionable scheme to impede the judicial process.
The case was remanded for further proceedings; the appellate court emphasized the high standard for striking pleadings and for dismissal as fraud.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the complaint is a "sham pleading" justifying striking/dismissal	Gleman's allegations are ambiguous and reasonably read to allege defendants used complaints as pretext to cover county retaliation for whistleblowing	Prior suit and related filings show irreconcilable statements about causation; therefore the second complaint is palpably false and a sham	Reversed: ambiguity precludes finding the pleading palpably false; striking/dismissal was improper absent clear and convincing proof
Whether inconsistency between the two suits warrants estoppel or summary dismissal	The claims can coexist; the release preserved third-party claims; factual causation can be litigated at trial	The later allegations conflict with Gleman's earlier position and should preclude the new suit	Distinguished Bailey; estoppel/defenses may be litigated, but are not grounds for striking as a sham where pleading is ambiguous
Proper standard for striking/dismissing for fraud on the court	Motion to strike tested like summary judgment; all doubts resolved for pleader; fraud requires clear and convincing evidence	Defendants contend they met the clear-and-convincing standard via prior-record contradictions	Court reiterated extreme/disfavored nature of the remedy and that defendants failed to meet the heavy burden required for dismissal for fraud

Rhea v. Hackney, 157 So. 190 (defines sham pleading as one "good on its face but absolutely false in fact")
Meadows v. Edwards, 82 So. 2d 733 (motion to strike sham pleading should be tested by summary-judgment standards)
Furst v. Blackman, 819 So. 2d 222 (doubts on a motion to strike are resolved in favor of the pleading)
Sunex Int'l, Inc. v. Colson, 964 So. 2d 780 (motion to strike is not a vehicle to try factual issues; court must determine if genuine issues exist)
Cherubino v. Fenstersheib & Fox, P.A., 925 So. 2d 1066 (dismissal for fraud requires clear and convincing proof of an unconscionable scheme to impede adjudication)
Bornstein v. Marcus, 169 So. 3d 1239 (recitation of standards for striking pleadings and fraud dismissal)
Bailey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 1181 (distinguishable case where subsequent suit’s allegations were unambiguously at odds with earlier suit)
Upland Dev. of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. Bridge, 910 So. 2d 942 (extreme nature of striking pleadings; such relief is disfavored)