Michael Frank Burgess v. United States
874 F.3d 1292
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Burgess pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 371) and money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957) and agreed in his plea to a collateral-action (appeal) waiver covering most collateral attacks.
- He admitted under oath at his change-of-plea hearing that he understood the waiver; the district court accepted the plea and sentenced him to 180 months.
- After direct appeal (counsel filed an Anders brief; this Court affirmed), Burgess filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion raising eight claims including Claim 5 (ineffective assistance for failing to timely object to PSR loss calculations and present mitigating evidence at sentencing).
- The district court ordered the government to respond. The government opposed the § 2255 motion on the merits and expressly did not invoke procedural defenses or the plea-waiver defense.
- The district court nevertheless dismissed Claim 5 sua sponte based solely on the plea agreement’s collateral-action waiver without giving notice to the parties or allowing them to be heard on that defense.
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of Claim 5 and remanded, holding a district court may not invoke a collateral-action waiver sua sponte under the circumstances and explaining the correct procedural approach.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a district court sua sponte invoke a plea agreement collateral-action waiver to dismiss a § 2255 claim when the government did not assert the defense? | Burgess: No; government’s failure to plead the waiver forfeits the defense under the Civil Rules. | Government: District court may raise threshold defenses sua sponte (by analogy to Day) to promote finality/efficiency. | Held: No—civil pleading rules govern; the court may not invoke the waiver sua sponte without following proper procedures. |
| Which procedural framework controls: Civil Rules (Rule 8(c) forfeiture) or the Day line allowing courts to raise certain habeas defenses? | Burgess: Rule 8(c) applies via § 2255 Rule 12; waiver is forfeited if not pleaded. | Gov: Day permits courts to resurrect forfeited threshold defenses in collateral cases. | Held: Civil Rules govern; Day does not extend to plea-waiver defense because it lacks the institutional values underlying Day. |
| If the government omits the waiver defense, may the court ask the government to assert it or allow amendment after notice? | Burgess: The court should require the government to have asserted it or forfeit it. | Government: Court can raise issue and allow amendment or consider it under Day. | Held: Court may—and should—ask the government whether it intends to rely on the waiver; the government may move to amend, and the movant must be given an opportunity to respond. |
| If a court considers such a defense sua sponte, what procedural safeguards are required? | Burgess: The court must give fair notice and chance to be heard; otherwise defense is forfeited. | Government: Day’s safeguards (notice, opportunity to be heard) are sufficient; court can correct oversights. | Held: If court contemplates invoking a forfeited defense it must give notice and opportunity to present positions; but here the district court failed to provide notice or a chance to be heard, so its dismissal was vacated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (district court may, in limited circumstances, raise certain forfeited habeas defenses but must give notice and opportunity to be heard)
- Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) (courts may not override a State’s deliberate waiver; emphasizes limits on sua sponte invocation of defenses and party-presentation principle)
- Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2014) (§ 2255 proceedings are civil in nature for procedural-rule purposes)
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (procedures for counsel moving to withdraw on appeal when no nonfrivolous issues exist)
- Davila v. United States, 569 U.S. 597 (2013) (addressing judicial participation in plea discussions and related due-process concerns)
- Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) (district courts possess inherent powers to manage their dockets and cases)