30 F.4th 739
8th Cir.2022Background
- Michael Faulk, a journalist, attended and reported on St. Louis protests (Sept. 15–17, 2017); he alleges he was kettled, pepper-sprayed, struck, zip-cuffed, arrested, detained 13 hours, and charged with failure to disperse.
- Faulk filed a multi-defendant § 1983 suit (First, Fourth, conspiracy, and other claims); Officer James Wood was added after discovery and alleged to have taken custody of Faulk’s bicycle.
- Faulk’s Fifth Amended Complaint (332 paragraphs) incorporated many factual allegations about a purported unconstitutional “kettling plan” and named Wood among officers said to have participated.
- The district court denied Wood’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion on the conspiracy claim; Wood and other defendants appealed qualified immunity and intracorporate-conspiracy issues.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo, concluding Faulk’s FAC lacked specific factual allegations tying Wood to the alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations or to an agreement to conspire.
- Court reversed: dismissed Wood from Counts I & II for failure to plead personal involvement and dismissed Count V (conspiracy) because intracorporate-conspiracy law was not clearly established for purposes of denying qualified immunity to the officers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wood is plausibly alleged to have violated Faulk’s First Amendment right to gather news (Count I) | Faulk: Wood was part of the arrest team and seized Faulk’s bicycle, supporting involvement in kettling that interfered with newsgathering | Wood: FAC contains only that he worked that night and took the bicycle; no factual link to the alleged interference | Reversed dismissal denial; allegations insufficient to show Wood’s personal participation; Wood dismissed from Count I |
| Whether Wood is plausibly alleged to have unreasonably seized/arrested Faulk (Count II) | Faulk: Wood participated in kettling and aided mass arrest | Wood: No factual allegations he was on the arrest team or that he intended to participate in kettling | Reversed denial; allegations were conclusory or merely proximity; Wood dismissed from Count II |
| Whether FAC plausibly alleges a § 1983 conspiracy by Wood (Count V) | Faulk: Wood agreed to participate in the illegal kettling plan and shared conspiratorial objectives | Wood: Bare assertion of agreement, without overt-act allegations linking him to constitutional harms | Held: Conspiracy claim against Wood implausible; qualified immunity applies to Wood on Count V |
| Whether intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine bars Count V for other officers (affecting qualified immunity) | Faulk: Courts have recognized § 1983 conspiracy claims against officers of same police dept.; Count V pleads concerted plan | Defs: Doctrine and Ziglar uncertainty mean officers lacked clear notice that intra-agency planning would yield § 1983 conspiracy liability | Held: Applicability unsettled; on these facts officers entitled to qualified immunity on Count V (doctrine’s uncertainty means liability not clearly established); Count V dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (two-step qualified-immunity framework)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard; avoid discovery to overcome qualified immunity)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading requirement)
- Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine: unsettled in civil-rights context; qualified immunity where law not clearly established)
- Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (origins of intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine in antitrust law)
- Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (municipal liability and need for culpability/causation to avoid respondeat superior)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability principles)
- White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2017) (mere presence/proximity insufficient to defeat qualified immunity)