Michael Demirdjian v. William Sullivan
832 F.3d 1060
9th Cir.2016Background
- In 2001 Michael Demirdjian (then 15) was tried twice and convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances; initial sentence was two consecutive life-without-parole terms, later resentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life (parole eligibility after 50 years).
- Physical evidence tied Demirdjian to the scene: bloody shoe prints matching cleaned bloody sneakers found in his trash, blood on his doorjamb, drops of his blood at the scene, dogs scent-identifying him on the murder weapon, and discarded property of one victim in his trash.
- At the second trial Demirdjian did not testify; prosecutors in closing repeatedly asked defense counsel to “explain” incriminating evidence and criticized the defense for lacking “competent, admissible” evidence; defense counsel rebutted instead of objecting.
- Post-conviction, Demirdjian sought habeas relief asserting (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to alleged Griffin (comment on silence) and burden-shifting prosecutorial remarks, and (2) an Eighth Amendment challenge that his 25-to-life consecutive terms were the functional equivalent of a juvenile mandatory life-without-parole sentence under Miller.
- The California courts summarily denied the state habeas petition; after AEDPA review the federal district court denied relief and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (under AEDPA deference) that fairminded jurists could conclude counsel’s strategy was reasonable and that the sentence was not necessarily equivalent to life without parole.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to prosecutors’ closing remarks as Griffin violations | Demirdjian: remarks impermissibly commented on his silence and asked for evidence only he could provide, violating Griffin | State: remarks reasonably construed as comments on the defense’s failure to introduce exculpatory, competent evidence rather than on defendant’s silence | Denied — under AEDPA, reasonable jurists could conclude no Griffin error and counsel reasonably rebutted rather than objected |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to alleged burden-shifting comments | Demirdjian: prosecutors repeatedly implied defense had to produce "competent" evidence, shifting burden to defendant | State: prosecutors explicitly stated government bore burden; comments criticized defense tactics and weaknesses, not legally shift burden | Denied — fairminded jurists could see no clear burden shift and counsel’s non‑objection was strategic |
| Whether counsel’s overall failure to object constituted deficient performance and caused prejudice under Strickland | Demirdjian: cumulative prosecutorial misconduct (Griffin, burden-shifting, emotional appeals) and weak case together create reasonable probability of different outcome | State: physical evidence was strong; jury instructions and multiple burden statements mitigated prejudice; counsel’s rebuttal and strategy plausibly reasonable | Denied — under doubly‑deferential AEDPA+Strickland review, no clear deficiency or prejudice shown |
| Whether consecutive 25‑to‑life terms for a juvenile are the “functional equivalent” of mandatory life without parole under Miller | Demirdjian: sentence effectively denies meaningful hope of release for juvenile and thus triggers Miller protections | State: sentence includes parole eligibility (here at age 66) and is materially distinguishable from mandatory LWOP; precedents permit distinguishing consecutive 25‑to‑life terms | Denied — reasonable jurists could conclude Miller does not control because parole remains possible |
Key Cases Cited
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibits prosecutor comment on defendant’s election not to testify)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state‑court decisions stand unless unreasonable application of clearly established law)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; requires individualized sentencing)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller held retroactive on collateral review)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (two consecutive 25‑to‑life terms differ from LWOP because they preserve parole possibility)
- United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988) (distinguishing permissible comments about defense weaknesses from impermissible comments on defendant’s silence)