Michael Day v. State of Indiana, 57 N.E.3d 809

Michael Day and his wife (M.D.) were separating and living together; arguments escalated over selling the house and were often audible to their children.
During one confrontation, Day screamed at M.D., leaned over her while she was in bed, and intentionally spat in her face, some entering her eye.
M.D. made multiple 911 calls; police arrived while Day continued screaming and cornering M.D.
Day was charged with and convicted (bench trial) of B‑misdemeanor disorderly conduct under I.C. § 35‑45‑1‑3(a)(1) for "engages in fighting or in tumultuous conduct."
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision; Day petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court (Rush, C.J.) considered statutory interpretation (de novo) and sufficiency of evidence review and affirmed the conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the "fighting" subsection requires a public‑disturbance element	State: statute omits a public element; General Assembly intended no public requirement	Day: "fighting" should be read to require a public disturbance	Held: No public‑disturbance element; statute applies to private as well as public conduct
Whether "fighting" includes verbal altercations (i.e., is ambiguous between physical vs verbal)	State: "fighting" unambiguously covers verbal and physical encounters	Day: "fighting" is ambiguous and should be construed narrowly to cover only physical altercations (rule of lenity)	Held: "Fighting" is ambiguous; interpret narrowly to mean physical altercations only
Whether noscitur a sociis and statutory context support a narrow meaning	—	Day: surrounding term "tumultuous conduct" suggests physical violence; statutes historically included public element but were revised	Held: Noscitur a sociis supports a physical‑only meaning (paired with "tumultuous conduct")
Sufficiency of evidence that Day engaged in a physical altercation	State: spitting is an intentional physical act sufficient to constitute a physical altercation	Day: conduct was verbal/angry but not a physical fight	Held: Sufficient evidence — intentional spitting satisfied the physical‑altercation element; conviction affirmed

Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767 (Ind. 2016) (statutory‑interpretation standard and application of plain‑meaning analysis)
Buelna v. State, 20 N.E.3d 137 (Ind. 2014) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986 (Conn. 1994) (interpreting "fighting" narrowly to require physical force)
State v. Cantwell, 676 P.2d 353 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (holding "fighting" involves physical acts of aggression)
J.S. v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (Court of Appeals definition treating "fighting" as physical or verbal)
Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. 2009) (discussing rule of lenity in criminal statutory interpretation)
Dugan v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 2003) (apply plain meaning and what statute does not say)
Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793 (Ind. 2012) (primary goal of statutory interpretation is legislative intent)
Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind. 1996) (noting Indiana statute was patterned on the Model Penal Code but omitted MPC's public‑element language)