907 F.3d 766
4th Cir.2018Background
- Survivors of two coal miners (Day and Barr) sued Dr. Paul Wheeler and Johns Hopkins entities, alleging Wheeler provided systematically biased expert radiology opinions in Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) administrative proceedings that caused denials of benefits.
- The complaint relied heavily on a 2013 Center for Public Integrity report alleging Wheeler’s unit rarely diagnosed black lung and that Wheeler reviewed ~1,500 films without diagnosing complicated pneumoconiosis in any case.
- After the CPI report, the Department of Labor warned adjudicators about Wheeler’s evidence and allowed affected claimants to seek reconsideration; both decedents’ survivors later obtained posthumous benefits and then filed this civil suit.
- Plaintiffs pleaded a civil RICO claim (mail fraud/obstruction predicates and a pattern of racketeering) plus state-law claims (fraud, tortious interference, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment), alleging use of false expert reports to deprive miners of benefits.
- The district court dismissed all claims under the Witness Litigation Privilege (absolute immunity for participants in judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings); the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Witness Litigation Privilege bar civil claims based on Wheeler’s expert testimony and preparatory work in BLBA proceedings? | Plaintiffs: Wheeler’s fraudulent, industry-biased conduct falls outside privilege and is actionable despite occurring in proceedings. | Defendants: Privilege is absolute for testimony and preparation in quasi-judicial proceedings; BLBA hearings are adjudicative. | Held: Privilege applies; Wheeler’s alleged testimony and preparation are protected. |
| Is the BLBA administrative forum sufficiently judicial to trigger witness immunity? | Plaintiffs: Administrative context or the specific nature of expert testimony makes immunity inapplicable. | Defendants: BLBA proceedings are adversarial with adjudicatory powers like courts; privilege therefore applies. | Held: BLBA hearings are quasi-judicial and privilege applies. |
| Does the civil RICO statute abrogate the common-law witness privilege so plaintiffs may pursue racketeering claims arising from testimony/related conduct? | Plaintiffs: RICO predicates (mail fraud, obstruction, bribery) and RICO’s remedial purpose permit civil RICO claims when witness conduct is part of a fraud scheme. | Defendants: RICO does not clearly displace the ancient common-law privilege; Congress did not expressly abrogate witness immunity in RICO. | Held: RICO does not clearly abrogate witness immunity; privilege remains an implied limit and bars the RICO claim. |
| Do plaintiffs’ state-law tort claims survive given Maryland’s litigation privilege? | Plaintiffs: Maryland law permits case-specific balancing; immunity should not bar fraud-style claims. | Defendants: Maryland applies an absolute privilege to words or opinions connected to judicial proceedings; state law mirrors federal privilege. | Held: Maryland law affords coextensive absolute privilege; state claims are barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (recognizes absolute witness immunity for testimony in judicial proceedings)
- Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012) (discusses scope of witness immunity and that it extends to preparation of testimony)
- Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (extends immunities to participants in administrative adjudications sharing judicial characteristics)
- Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996) (applies common-law immunity to statements made in response to official investigations)
- O’Brien & Gere Eng’rs v. City of Salisbury, 135 A.3d 473 (Md. 2016) (describes Maryland litigation privilege as robust and rooted in public policy)