Michael Davis v. Hollins Law
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14517
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Davis obtained an American Express business card but used it for personal purchases; he defaulted and account was referred to Hollins Law for collection.
- Hollins Law and Davis exchanged multiple communications (calls and emails) over several weeks about a potential settlement; Davis made a 30% settlement offer and sought status updates.
- On September 25, 2012, Hollins Law collector Gregory Daulton left a voicemail: “Hello, this is a call for Michael Davis from Gregory at Hollins Law. Please call sir, it is important, my number is 866-513-5033.” The voicemail did not explicitly say “debt collector.”
- Davis admitted that, combining the voicemail with prior communications, he understood the call was from a debt collector.
- Davis sued under the FDCPA § 1692e(11) claiming the voicemail failed to disclose it was from a debt collector; the district court found a technical violation and entered judgment for Davis. Hollins Law appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the voicemail—viewed in context of prior communications—sufficiently disclosed it was from a debt collector to the least sophisticated debtor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1692e(11) was violated by a subsequent communication that did not expressly say “debt collector” | Davis: Any subsequent communication must expressly disclose it is from a debt collector; absence is per se violation | Hollins: Disclosure can be satisfied by context; no magic words required if least sophisticated debtor would understand | Held: No violation; context (prior emails/settlement negotiations + ID as “Hollins Law”) sufficed to disclose debt-collection purpose |
| Whether to apply least-sophisticated-debtor objective standard | Davis: Standard applies to evaluate misleading nature | Hollins: Agreed standard applies but argued met it | Held: Applied least-sophisticated-debtor standard; message not misleading in context |
| Whether literal/technical non-disclosure is actionable regardless of materiality | Davis: Technical omission is actionable under § 1692e(11) | Hollins: Court should avoid hypertechnical rule; immaterial/ de minimis errors not actionable | Held: Court rejects hypertechnical, de minimis theory; requires material likelihood to mislead; here no material deception |
| Whether prior communications made the voicemail non-actionable | Davis: Voicemail alone insufficient; needs explicit debt-collector language each time | Hollins: Prior emails/phone calls made identity and purpose clear | Held: Prior communications rendered the voicemail sufficient to disclose debt-collection origin |
Key Cases Cited
- Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) (establishes least-sophisticated-debtor standard for FDCPA § 1692e claims)
- Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (FDCPA errors must be material to be actionable)
- Evon v. Law Offs. of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejects bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations under least-sophisticated-debtor standard)
- Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993) (supports presumption of basic debtor understanding)
- Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (similar limits on idiosyncratic debtor interpretations)
- Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1999) (standard of review for bench trials)