Michael Cuero v. Matthew Cate
850 F.3d 1019
9th Cir.2017Background
- In 2005 Michael Cuero pleaded guilty to two felonies (great bodily injury while driving under the influence; felon in possession) and admitted priors pursuant to a written charge-bargain that left sentencing to the court; the plea reduced exposure to a maximum of 14 years, 4 months.
- After the plea was accepted and the misdemeanor count was dismissed, the prosecution sought to amend the complaint to add a second strike and additional felony priors, raising exposure drastically.
- A different trial judge granted the amendment under California law (Penal Code § 969.5 et seq.); Cuero withdrew his initial plea and entered a new plea admitting the added strikes and stipulating to 25 years to life; he was sentenced accordingly.
- State courts and the district court denied habeas relief; a Ninth Circuit panel granted relief holding the post-plea, pre-judgment amendment violated clearly established federal law and required specific performance of the original plea.
- The en banc petition was denied; Judge Wardlaw (concurring) defended the panel approach under Supreme Court precedent (Santobello, Mabry) and California contract principles; Judge Callahan (dissenting) argued no Supreme Court precedent clearly prohibits post-plea, pre-judgment amendments, emphasizing deference to state procedures and statutory amendment authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether due process forbids a prosecutor from amending charges after a plea induced by a plea agreement but before judgment | Cuero: due process attaches once plea is accepted and conviction entered on that plea; Santobello/Mabry require fulfillment of prosecutorial promises | State: Supreme Court has not clearly held that due process bars post-plea, pre-judgment amendments; California statutes permit amendments and allow withdrawal of plea | Panel (as defended in concurrence): Amendment violated clearly established federal law; concurrence supports panel. Dissent: No clearly established Supreme Court rule; amendment permissible under state law and discretion. |
| When constitutional protection to enforce a plea agreement attaches (entry of plea vs. entry of judgment) | Cuero: protection attaches when plea is accepted and conviction follows the plea (pre-judgment) | State: protection is unclear; reasonable to treat attachment at entry of judgment; Mabry does not clearly resolve the point | Panel/concurring judge: sided with attachment at conviction following plea; dissent: reasonable disagreement exists; Supreme Court has not clearly resolved the issue. |
| Proper remedy for prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement (specific performance vs. withdrawal/other relief) | Cuero: specific performance is the sole adequate remedy to restore bargained-for expectations when plea was fully performed | State: remedy choice is a state-court discretion; Supreme Court does not mandate specific performance and allowing withdrawal can fully unwind the bargain | Panel: ordered relief consistent with enforcing plea (concurrence defends specific performance here). Dissent: specific performance not mandated; withdrawal was permissible and consistent with state-law discretion. |
| Whether AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief because Supreme Court precedent was not clearly established on these facts | Cuero: Santobello/Mabry and related authority clearly establish the rule | State: Supreme Court has not squarely addressed post-plea, pre-judgment amendments; fairminded disagreement precludes habeas relief under AEDPA | Concurrence: Supreme Court law was clearly established and state court unreasonably applied it. Dissent: reasonable jurists could disagree; AEDPA bars relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutorial promises that induce a plea must be fulfilled under due process)
- Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (a plea bargain alone is executory; the ensuing guilty plea implicates the Constitution)
- Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (defendant has due process right to enforce plea agreement; remedies for breach may include specific performance)
- Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (construction and obligations of plea agreements are matters largely governed by state law)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (AEDPA requires state-court decisions to be measured against Supreme Court precedent as of the time the state court rendered its decision)