Michael Cuero v. Matthew Cate, 827 F.3d 879

Background

In Dec. 2005 Cuero pleaded guilty in San Diego Superior Court to two felonies (DUI causing injury; unlawful possession of a firearm), admitted one strike and four prison priors, and the court accepted the plea; the parties and court discussed a maximum exposure of 14 years, 4 months.
The plea colloquy and a signed change-of-plea form were entered into the record; the prosecution moved to dismiss a misdemeanor count and the court granted it, and the court signed an order stating the defendant was convicted.
The day before sentencing the prosecutor moved to amend the complaint to add an additional prior-strike allegation, which would expose Cuero to a life term under California's three-strikes law; a different superior court judge allowed the amendment and permitted Cuero to withdraw his plea.
Cuero ultimately entered a new plea resulting in an indeterminate 25-years-to-life sentence and challenged the amendment and resultant sentencing on habeas, arguing the prosecutor breached a court-approved plea agreement and that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law.
The Ninth Circuit majority held the state courts unreasonably failed to apply Supreme Court precedent (Santobello and related authority), concluded the prosecution breached the binding plea bargain, and ordered a conditional writ directing resentencing consistent with the original plea terms (maximum 14 years, 4 months).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Cuero)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Cuero had a binding, court-approved plea agreement that limited sentencing exposure	The written plea form, prosecutor’s dismissal of the misdemeanor in court, and the court’s acceptance of the plea created a binding bargain limiting maximum punishment to 14 years, 4 months	The plea form and colloquy show "no deals with the People" and no enforceable agreement preventing later amendment; any amendment was authorized by state law	Held for Cuero: the plea was binding when accepted by the court and the state was bound by its promise limiting punishment
Whether the prosecutor’s post-plea motion to amend the complaint to add a strike breached that plea agreement and violated due process	Seeking to add a strike after the court-approved plea breached the bargain and deprived Cuero of the benefit of his plea inducing promises	State argues amendment was authorized by California law (e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 969.5) and did not violate Cuero’s rights; withdrawal of plea cured any defect	Held for Cuero: amendment breached the plea agreement and the state court unreasonably applied federal law by allowing it
Proper remedy for a breached, court-approved plea agreement	Specific performance (enforce the original bargain and resentence within its limits) because Cuero had performed and the state received its bargain	Withdrawal of plea and ability to replead or proceed to trial is an adequate remedy; courts may permissibly allow amendment and rescission	Held for Cuero: state court unreasonably failed to order specific performance; withdrawal was insufficient because it deprived Cuero of the original bargain
AEDPA deference: whether the state-court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law	Cuero: Santobello, Boykin, and related precedent obligate enforcement of promises underlying a plea accepted by the court and require state courts to supply an adequate remedy	State: fair-minded jurists could conclude no binding promise existed; Supreme Court cases (e.g., Mabry/Johnson) permit remedies short of specific performance and limit federal intrusion into state contract-interpretation questions	Held: Under AEDPA, the last reasoned state decision unreasonably applied Supreme Court law; habeas relief granted and remanded for resentencing consistent with original plea

Key Cases Cited

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutorial promises that induce a plea must be fulfilled; state court should fashion appropriate remedy for breach)
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (a consummated plea has constitutional significance; plea-related promises matter to due process analysis)
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (construction of plea agreements generally a matter for state law within broad bounds; court reviews constitutional effects)
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (a guilty plea is more than an admission; it is a conviction once accepted)
Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (court enforced specific performance of plea terms on habeas where state breached a plea bargain)
Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (ordering relief when state breached plea and defendant had already performed)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plea bargains are contractual; remedies for breach include withdrawal of plea or other relief)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard for habeas relief; errors with substantial and injurious effect require relief)