Michael Cooper v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5238

Appellant Michael Cooper and two co-defendants were indicted for multiple counts of aggravated robbery arising from a single home invasion, and the jury convicted Cooper on five counts with various long prison terms to run concurrently.
The home invasion occurred in July 2009; the assailants wore black clothing, covered faces, brandished weapons, and assaulted multiple occupants to steal valuables.
Victims sustained serious injuries including head trauma, fractures, and ongoing pain; several occupants testified about the assault and the attackers’ actions during the robbery.
Physical and forensic evidence included DNA on a bandana and gloves, gunshot residue on a glove, and ballistics tying a gun to a crime-scene shell casing; cell-phone records placed Cooper near the scene around the time of the robbery.
Police recovered items from the getaway, and witnesses, including Cooper’s wife and stepson, linked Cooper to the Cadillac used in the robbery; one accomplice testified against Cooper under trial.
After conviction, the State disclosed that DNA analyst Morris had prior contamination issues in other cases; Cooper moved for a new trial claiming Brady v. Maryland materiality, which the trial court denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether multiple counts per victim violate double jeopardy	Cooper: separate bodily-injury and threat counts per victim are the same offense.	Cooper: bodily-injury and threat offenses are distinct offenses with separate gravamens.	Not a violation; separate offenses exist for robbery by bodily injury and robbery by threat.
Whether facially invalid double jeopardy occurred for the same victims	Cooper: dual counts per victim collapse into a single offense.	Cooper: separate acts by him or accomplices support multiple offenses.	No facial error; record shows separate acts and liability under the law of parties.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion denying a Brady-based new trial	Cooper: nondisclosure of Morris’s work history was material to guilt/punishment.	Cooper: disclosure was not material; evidence remained overwhelming.	No abuse of discretion; undisclosed history not material; no new trial required.

Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1977) (double jeopardy requires only a single offense count when the legislature intended one unit)
Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (unit of prosecution and double jeopardy considerations in Texas)
Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (defines allowable unit of prosecution and separate acts analysis)
Ex parte Hawkins, 6 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (robbery as assaultive offense framework for unit of prosecution)
Gonzales v. State, 191 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006) (robbery offenses with different gravamens are distinct offenses)
Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (separate and distinct acts constitute separate offenses for double jeopardy)
Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (same principle: same offense means not the same by name; focus on acts)
Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (materiality and prejudice standards for Brady requirements)
Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1985) (materiality standard for impeachment and exculpatory evidence)
Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (due process and Brady materiality applied to new-trial determinations)
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (separate offenses can be based on separately inflicted injuries)