Michael Catinella v. Cook County, Illinois
881 F.3d 514
7th Cir.2018Background
- Michael Catinella was a Cook County Department of Transportation employee (1994–2013) promoted to supervisor in 2009 and with no prior discipline before 2013.
- August 2012: Independent Inspector General investigators questioned Catinella about a public fuel-pump bidding probe; he refused to sign documents and surrendered a small work knife to his attorney at the investigators’ request.
- January–February 2013: Coworkers filed a grievance alleging preferential treatment; County placed Catinella on emergency leave and then suspended him pending investigation. Four witnesses gave inconsistent statements that he threatened to “shoot up the workplace.” He was charged with disorderly conduct; charge later dropped when witnesses failed to appear.
- February–March 2013: Inspector General issued a summary report alleging weapon possession; Catinella was denied confrontation of witnesses, evidence, or counsel at a predisciplinary meeting and was terminated for possessing a weapon and making threats.
- Administrative grievance was denied multiple times. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (procedural and substantive due process, equal protection) and § 1981 (retaliation). District court dismissed twice (second dismissal with prejudice); Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Catinella had a protected property interest in continued employment (procedural due process) | County policies/procedures and his understanding created entitlement to continued employment; procedural steps were not followed before termination | No state law, ordinance, contract, or substantive limit prevents County from firing him; policies alone create only procedural rights, not property interests | Dismissed — plaintiff failed to plead a cognizable property interest under state law |
| Whether defendants’ actions violated substantive due process ("conscience-shocking" conduct) | Termination was retaliatory and arbitrary after he refused to cooperate with the bidding probe and was later accused of threats; conduct was abusive and oppressive | Even if unfair or pretextual, conduct was not the sort of extreme, conscience-shocking government action that implicates substantive due process | Dismissed — allegations do not meet the high "shocks the conscience" standard |
| Whether plaintiff stated a race-based retaliation claim under § 1981 | Alleged retaliation and political motive; characterized as "reverse retaliation" against a white employee | Complaint contains no allegations of race-based discrimination or that he aided a victim of racial discrimination as required by § 1981 retaliation theory | Dismissed — no factual support for a § 1981 or § 1983 equal-protection race-based retaliation claim |
| Whether leave to amend should be granted again | Plaintiff sought another opportunity to amend to remedy defects | District court declined a third amendment; defendants urged final dismissal | Affirmed — appellate court found denial of further amendment was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010) (complaint must present a coherent story with sufficient factual detail)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (property interests defined by state law; due-process protections for public employment)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interests are created by existing rules or understandings from independent sources)
- Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007) (employee handbook/procedural rights do not alone create a protectable property interest)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due process requires conduct that shocks the conscience)
- Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (example of "conscience-shocking" conduct violating substantive due process)
- CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (§ 1981 retaliation requires showing retaliation for helping a victim secure § 1981 rights)
- Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2006) (background circumstances required to show invidious discrimination for reverse-race claims)
- Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 658 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2011) (standard for reviewing denial of leave to amend: reversal only if no reasonable person could agree)