Michael Carter v. Stephen Duncan
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5804
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- On Sept. 12, 1999 Friday Gardner was shot dead outside an apartment building in Chicago; Michael Carter and Michael Stone were tried together and convicted of first-degree murder; Carter got 30 years.
- Prosecution theory: multiple shooters; accountability instruction allowed conviction of Carter if he aided/abeted even if he did not fire the fatal shots. Stone admitted firing and asserted self‑defense; Carter maintained he was unarmed and merely present.
- At trial several eyewitnesses with ties to victim or defendants gave inconsistent accounts; defense called Michella Anderson and Stone (who claimed he alone shot after Gardner drew a gun); Carter did not testify.
- Postconviction, Carter produced affidavits from two additional potential witnesses (Jeremiah McReynolds — allegedly disinterested, saw "Man"/Stone shoot and heard Gardner pull an object; Paul Cálmese — police report saying Stone and Jones fired) and claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate/call them.
- Illinois appellate court applied Strickland but focused on prejudice, concluding the proffered testimony would have been cumulative or insufficient to overcome the accountability instruction and that the evidence was not closely balanced; federal district court denied habeas relief; Seventh Circuit affirmed under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Carter's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate/call McReynolds and Cálmese | Counsel’s omission deprived Carter of exculpatory, non‑biased testimony (McReynolds disinterested; Cálmese corroborates Carter not a shooter), creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome | Counsel’s decision was strategic or reasonable; any additional testimony would be cumulative and would not overcome accountability instruction; no reasonable probability of different result | Court: Even if performance may have been deficient (investigation unclear), the state court reasonably concluded the missing testimony would not have produced a different outcome; AEDPA deference applies; habeas denied |
| Standard of review: whether state court applied correct Strickland prejudice standard | Carter argued state court imposed an extra "unreliable/fundamentally unfair" gloss beyond Strickland’s reasonable‑probability standard | State relied on its Strickland analysis and outcome determination | Court: Although state opinion included the "unreliable/fundamentally unfair" language, its analysis evaluated outcome probability (Strickland). Thus AEDPA deference applies to the state court’s prejudice finding |
| Whether the district court should conduct de novo review of Strickland performance prong because state court omitted it | Carter sought de novo review of deficiency because state court did not analyze performance | State argued AEDPA deference still governs and Carter waived some arguments | Court: De novo review applies to the unaddressed performance prong, but the case is resolved on prejudice under AEDPA so relief denied |
| Whether an evidentiary hearing/remand was required to develop record on counsel’s investigation | Carter argued the record lacks information about counsel’s investigation and an evidentiary hearing might show deficient performance | State argued limitations and that petitioner failed to develop the record in state court (§2254(e)(2) issue) | Court: §2254(e)(2) not an absolute bar here (state procedure likely would have afforded a hearing); nevertheless, the state court’s prejudice determination was not unreasonable, so remand/hearing not necessary |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (AEDPA review framework; unreasonable application standard)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (deference to state court reasonable applications of federal law)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (federal habeas review under §2254(d)(1) limited to state‑court record)
- Montgomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1988) (disinterested witness can be especially significant where other witnesses are biased)