Michael Bynoe v. Isidro Baca
966 F.3d 972
| 9th Cir. | 2020Background
- Nevada abolished the traditional insanity defense in 1995 and allowed a "guilty but mentally ill" plea during the interim; the Nevada Supreme Court held that abolition violated due process in Finger v. State of Nevada, and the Legislature later restored the insanity defense.
- Michael Bynoe pleaded guilty but mentally ill during the period the plea was available, was convicted and sentenced to life with parole eligibility after ten years, and later sought federal habeas relief arguing his due process rights were violated by the abolition of the insanity defense.
- Bynoe filed a federal habeas petition that was entirely unexhausted; the district court denied a Rhines stay and dismissed the petition for lack of exhaustion under the circuit law then-applied, and Bynoe’s appeals and certiorari petitions were unsuccessful at that time.
- The Ninth Circuit later decided Mena v. Long, holding district courts may grant a Rhines stay for petitions consisting solely of unexhausted claims, which directly affected the reasoning underlying the district court’s dismissal of Bynoe’s petition.
- Within seven months of Mena, Bynoe moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to reopen his habeas proceeding so he could seek a Rhines stay; the district court denied the motion as untimely and not showing extraordinary circumstances.
- The Ninth Circuit majority reversed, holding Bynoe’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion was timely and that extraordinary circumstances existed under the Phelps six-factor framework; the case was remanded so Bynoe may seek a Rhines stay under Mena.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on an intervening change in law (Mena) may reopen a district-court dismissal of an entirely unexhausted habeas petition | Bynoe: Mena created a new, favorable rule; reopening is appropriate under Rule 60(b)(6) | Nevada/district court: motion untimely and no extraordinary circumstances; district properly denied reopening | Reversed — 60(b)(6) timely here and extraordinary circumstances shown; reopen and consider Rhines stay request |
| Whether Rhines stay-and-abeyance is available for petitions that are entirely unexhausted | Bynoe: Mena answers yes; district courts have discretion to stay fully unexhausted petitions | State: prior circuit practice required dismissal of fully unexhausted petitions; COA denial suggested issue not debatable | Mena controls: district courts may grant Rhines stays for fully unexhausted petitions (so Bynoe may seek such a stay on remand) |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in weighing the Phelps factors (nature of change in law, diligence, reliance/finality, delay, relation to judgment, comity) | Bynoe: Mena resolved an unsettled question, he was diligent and delay was reasonable; state’s finality/comity interests minimal because dismissal was procedural | District court/state: strong state comity and finality interests; COA denial and delay counsel against reopening | Reversed — majority found all six Phelps factors (flexibly applied) favored reopening; district abused its discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (stay-and-abeyance to permit state exhaustion to avoid AEDPA timing problems)
- Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016) (Ninth Circuit: Rhines stays available for fully unexhausted petitions)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (Rule 60(b) cannot be used to raise a successive habeas claim; procedural attacks on AEDPA limitations may be Rule 60(b) matters)
- Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (six-factor framework for Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on intervening change in law)
- Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief in extraordinary circumstances)
- Finger v. State of Nevada, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001) (Nevada Supreme Court: abolition of insanity defense violated due process)
- Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (Lundy dismissal rule for mixed exhausted/unexhausted habeas petitions)