Michael Barnett v. City of Southside Place, 522 S.W.3d 653

Background

Barnett was a City detective (Mar 2013–Sept 2014) who reported an alleged illegal ticket‑quota practice to his chief and the Texas Rangers in Aug 2014.
Barnett submitted a resignation letter Aug 19, 2014 (effective Sept 3); on Sept 2 Moss (City Manager) issued an internal inquiry and prepared a Notice of Termination for insubordination after Barnett refused to answer questions; Barnett testified he had already resigned.
The City later submitted a TCOLE F‑5 form marking Barnett as "dishonorably discharged" and sent a letter to TCOLE about amended F‑5s.
Barnett sued under the Texas Whistleblower Act claiming adverse personnel actions in retaliation for his report; the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing (inter alia) no adverse action and no causation.
The trial court granted the City’s plea and dismissed Barnett’s whistleblower claim with prejudice; Barnett appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Barnett suffered an "adverse personnel action" under the Whistleblower Act	Barnett: termination/termination letter/F‑5 filing and related statements are adverse actions (including constructive discharge)	City: Barnett voluntarily resigned before termination; post‑resignation acts cannot constitute adverse "personnel action" under the statute	Held: No fact issue — undisputed evidence shows Barnett resigned before termination; statutory definition limits "personnel action" to effects on an ongoing employment relationship, so post‑resignation actions did not waive immunity
Whether the adverse action (if any) was "because" of the protected report	Barnett: City’s sequence and documents support causation	City: No evidence linking protected report to any adverse action; legitimate basis (insubordination) existed	Held: Court did not reach detailed causation analysis because no adverse action was established; Barnett failed to raise fact issue on causation
Whether former‑employee, post‑employment retaliation claims are covered by the Whistleblower Act	Barnett: analogizes to federal Title VII precedent allowing post‑employment retaliation claims and urges similar construction	City: Statutory definitions limit "public employee" and "personnel action" to current employment effects; Act does not reach former‑employee post‑employment retaliation	Held: The court construes statutory definitions narrowly — Whistleblower Act protects actions affecting benefits of an ongoing employment relationship; does not extend to former employees’ post‑employment harms
Whether Barnett was entitled to additional discovery before the plea hearing	Barnett: needed time to depose witnesses (e.g., McCarty) to create fact issues	City: Court properly set hearing; discovery schedule and orders were within trial court discretion	Held: Error not preserved — Barnett did not obtain or record a ruling/objection on the scheduling orders; appellate court declines review

Key Cases Cited

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standards for plea to the jurisdiction and resolution of jurisdictional fact disputes)
Montgomery County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2007) (adopts Burlington objective‑materiality standard for what constitutes an adverse personnel action under the Whistleblower Act)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (objective materially adverse standard for retaliation claims)
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (U.S. 1997) (Title VII protection construed to include former employees for certain retaliatory acts)
State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. 2009) (jurisdictional prerequisites for Whistleblower Act claims)
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (resolution of plea to the jurisdiction when evidence is undisputed)