Background

• Parents (Dotson — Mother; Sprouse — Father) litigated competing petitions to modify a parenting plan before a juvenile court magistrate on January 5, 2016; the magistrate announced a bench ruling and directed counsel to prepare a written order.
• The magistrate signed written findings and recommendations on January 14, 2016; the written order included a bolded notice about the five-day rehearing period under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107.
• Mother filed a pro se request for rehearing on January 15, 2016 (the day after the written order was signed); the juvenile court judge the same day signed an order confirming the magistrate’s order as the juvenile court’s decree.
• The juvenile court later dismissed Mother’s request for rehearing as untimely, reasoning the five-day period ran from the January 5 bench hearing (when the magistrate announced the ruling), not from the later written findings.
• Mother appealed; the Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo to decide whether the five-day rehearing period runs from the bench hearing or from transmission/entry of the magistrate’s written findings.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Kyle v. Williams, 98 S.W.3d 661 (Tenn. 2003) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
• Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC, 433 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2014) (apply plain statutory meaning when unambiguous)
• Harris v. Haynes, 445 S.W.3d 143 (Tenn. 2014) (carry out legislative intent without expanding or restricting statute)
• Brundage v. Cumberland Cnty., 357 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. 2011) (statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably have more than one meaning)
• General Care Corp. v. Olsen, 705 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. 1986) (all words of statute must be given effect)
• Kelly v. Evans, 43 S.W.3d 514 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (request for rehearing by judge contemplates a traditional de novo hearing)