Michael Aaland, V. Crst Home Solutions, Llc, Et Ano.
86708-3
| Wash. Ct. App. | Sep 15, 2025Background
- CRST Home Solutions sent unsolicited recruitment text messages to Washington cell phones seeking independent contractors to perform delivery/installation work for CRST’s retail clients (e.g., Lowe’s, Best Buy).
- Aaland received a text recruiting a licensed plumber to perform installations; CRST’s recruiters cold‑call, email, or text potential contractors and vet them for insurance, background checks, and onboarding.
- CRST markets the size and reach of its contractor network and ties recruiter compensation/performance to contractor activations; CRST’s business revenue depends on contractor availability.
- Aaland filed a class action alleging the texts violated the Commercial Electronic Mail Act (CEMA), RCW 19.190, and thus were per se violations of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).
- At summary judgment the sole legal question agreed by parties: whether the texts are “commercial” under RCW 19.190.010(3) (i.e., sent to “promote real property, goods, or services for sale or lease”).
- The trial court granted summary judgment to CRST; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the texts are commercial under CEMA and remanding for damages and fee determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether texts qualify as “commercial” under RCW 19.190.010(3) | Texts need not attempt to sell directly to recipient; promoting services for sale to anyone (i.e., CRST’s services) suffices | Messages were recruiting contractors, not offering goods/services for sale; not facilitating a sale or charging recipients | Held: “Promote” is broad; recruiting texts that further business growth are commercial under CEMA |
| Whether “promote” requires facilitating a transactional sale | “Promote” covers contributing to growth/prosperity or launching/advertising a business/service | Limiting “promote” to facilitating sales avoids overbroad application | Held: Court applies ordinary dictionary meaning; statute’s plain language requires no such limitation |
| Applicability of federal cases (TCPA/WADAD) | N/A (relies on state statute and plain meaning) | Federal interpretations support narrowing “commercial solicitation” scope | Held: Federal cases are persuasive only; Washington plain‑language control; legislative word choice differs from WADAD |
| Remedy at summary judgment stage | Seek summary judgment for class based on undisputed law and facts | Opposed; sought dismissal on legal grounds | Held: Material facts undisputed; remand to enter summary judgment for Aaland/class and determine damages/fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Neighbors v. King County, 15 Wn. App. 2d 71 (procedural standard for summary judgment review)
- Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174 Wn.2d 157 (summary judgment standards)
- Wright v. Lyft, Inc., 189 Wn.2d 718 (construction of CEMA; text message prohibition context)
- Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516 (plain‑meaning statutory interpretation)
- Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1 (statutory interpretation principles)
- Davis v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957 (give effect to all statutory language)
- State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723 (assume legislature means what it says)
- City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171 (sufficient definiteness in statutory language)