47 N.E.3d 381
Ind. Ct. App.2015Background
- Michael Wartell served as IPFW chancellor for 18 years and was subject to Purdue’s mandatory retirement/renewal policy; he sought a Board exception which was denied.
- Fort Wayne businessman Lawrence Lee and other local donors met with Purdue President Córdova and, at her request, each submitted confidential letters opposing Wartell’s extension.
- Lee’s letter to Córdova described concerns about Wartell’s integrity and character (e.g., “word not always serving as his bond,” “broken faith,” “lack of integrity,” and that fundraising would be difficult while he remained chancellor).
- Wartell sued Lee alleging defamation per se (among other claims). Lee moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted partial summary judgment dismissing the defamation per se claim.
- On appeal, the question was whether Lee’s statements were defamatory per se (i.e., whether the language, on its face, imputed objectively verifiable misconduct in Wartell’s office or profession so that damages could be presumed).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: Lee’s statements were vague opinions about character needing extrinsic context and therefore were not defamatory per se.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lee’s letter statements are defamatory per se | Wartell: statements impute professional misconduct/character flaws tied to his chancellorship and thus are defamatory per se requiring no extrinsic evidence | Lee: statements are subjective opinion/generalized characterizations (not objectively verifiable misconduct) and therefore not defamatory per se | Affirmed for Lee — statements are vague opinions needing extrinsic context and do not impute actionable misconduct per se |
Key Cases Cited
- Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2010) (statements imputing theft/fraud were objectively verifiable misconduct and qualified as defamation per se)
- Baker v. Tremco, 917 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. 2009) (vague term “inappropriate” sales practices too imprecise to impute misconduct for defamation per se)
- Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (epithets like “liar” were held not defamatory per se where context showed they were personal attacks rather than verifiable misconduct)
- Erdman v. White, 411 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (letter alleging a “questionable reputation” injured former president’s business standing and supported defamation per se where it caused concrete financial harm)
- Big Wheel Restaurants, Inc. v. Bronstein, 302 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (defamation per se requires words that have defamatory imputation on their face without reference to extrinsic evidence)