MICAELA P. BENNETT VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-1774-15, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-1770-19

Plaintiff Micaela Bennett was an at-will legal specialist at DMHAS assigned to Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital who complained about perceived legal and safety violations (delayed community placements for disabled patients; armed courtroom guards' training).
Management repeatedly warned Bennett about a confrontational, insubordinate tone; coworkers and medical staff complained; she received a five-day suspension in Sept. 2016 for refusing to sign an ethics/confidentiality form (she signed after suspension "under duress").
In Aug. 2017 Bennett contacted Greystone's CEO about a mistaken retirement article and escalated the matter to the Commissioner; on Aug. 21, 2017 she was terminated, supervisors citing years of insubordination and unprofessional interactions as reasons.
Bennett sued under CEPA (hostile work environment/retaliation) and the LAD (retaliation via termination). Following a jury trial, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.
On appeal Bennett argued (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that defendants must be "the" proximate cause of her damages (rather than "a" cause), and (2) the court improperly charged the jury on the prima facie elements of the LAD claim after the employer had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether charging proximate cause was improper in LAD case and whether judge misstated standard by saying defendants must be "the" proximate cause of damages	Bennett: Proximate-cause instruction is inappropriate in LAD retaliation cases and the judge misstated the standard by saying defendant's conduct had to be the sole cause of damages	State: Court followed the model proximate-cause charge; the judge's single slip saying "the" instead of "a" was harmless and the verdict sheet used correct language	Affirmed; the judge tracked the model charge, the slip was harmless, and proximate-cause was ultimately irrelevant because jury did not reach damages question
Whether the court erred by instructing the jury on the prima facie elements of the LAD claim after the employer articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason	Bennett: Once a defendant articulates a non-discriminatory reason, the prima facie framework is irrelevant and instructing the jury on those elements confuses and misleads	State: Model jury charges and precedent permit the jury to decide disputed facts; prima facie matters resolved as a legal threshold do not preclude the jury from deciding the same factual disputes under the plenary preponderance standard	Affirmed; model charges were proper, jury must resolve disputed facts under the higher plenary standard, and instructing on elements did not create reversible error

State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (instructional-error standard for jury charges)
Mogull v. CB Commercial Real Estate Group, Inc., 162 N.J. 449 (approach to prima facie instruction and jury's role in deciding ultimate discrimination issue)
Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436 (jury may consider performance issues in plenary case despite prima facie-stage determinations)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (prima facie burden and employer's articulation of nondiscriminatory reason)
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (employer's articulated reason taken as true at the McDonnell Douglas second step)
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (evidence required to show pretext under burden-shifting)
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163 (CEPA requires objectively reasonable belief of illegal or harmful activity)