Miami-Dade County v. Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n
103 So. 3d 236
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2012Background
- Miami-Dade County and Mayor Gimenez sought a writ of certiorari to quash a PERC order denying both a motion to quash subpoenas and a protective order in an unfair labor practice proceeding brought by the PBA.
- The subpoenas require Mayor Gimenez to testify in the PBA proceeding.
- The Court must determine jurisdiction and whether the PERC order departs from the essential requirements of the law.
- The court analyzes whether discovery against a high-ranking official is proper and whether the requested testimony is irreparably harmful and not remediable on appeal.
- The court cites the need to avoid irreparable harm and to protect the legislature and executive functions from improper intrusions through discovery.
- The petition is granted and the PERC order is quashed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the PERC order | Gimenez asserts certiorari jurisdiction is proper to prevent irreparable harm | PBA argues jurisdiction is limited and relief is inappropriate | Court has jurisdiction |
| Whether the PERC order departs from the essential requirements of the law | Subpoenas are improper as to motive and exceed necessary discovery | PBA may seek relevant testimony in unfair labor practice | Yes; order departs from essential requirements |
| Whether the subpoenas seeking Mayor Gimenez’s motive for veto decisions are proper | Motives behind legislative actions are irrelevant and not subject to discovery | Motions for testifying authorities require examination of motives | Unreasonable; improper to compel testimony about motives |
| Whether Mayor Gimenez should be compelled to testify given information available from other sources | Information already available from veto statements, public records, and lower officials should suffice | Unique and necessary information may require testimony from the mayor | Not permitted; high-ranking official should not be compelled when other sources suffice |
Key Cases Cited
- Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. American Educational Enterprises, LLC, 99 So.3d 450 (Fla.2012) (irreparable harm and certiorari standards; jurisdictional prongs)
- Horne v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 901 So.2d 238 (Fla.1st DCA 2005) (discovery review; traditional certiorari review of discovery orders)
- City of Gainesville v. Scotty’s, Inc., 489 So.2d 1196 (Fla.1st DCA 1986) (motives in enacting ordinances irrelevant to judicial inquiry)
- Hillsborough Cnty. v. Pinellas Cnty., 425 So.2d 1196 (Fla.2d DCA 1983) (motive and reasoning of officials generally irrelevant absent fraud)
- Manatee Cnty. v. Estech Gen. Chems. Corp., 402 So.2d 75 (Fla.2d DCA 1981) (motive of governmental action not relevant; chks on testimony)
- Rainbow Lighting, Inc. v. Chiles, 707 So.2d 939 (Fla.3d DCA 1998) (motives in enacting ordinances generally not subject to scrutiny)
- City of Pompano Beach v. Big Daddy’s, Inc., 375 So.2d 281 (Fla.1979) (testimony about motives in legislative actions deemed irrelevant)
- Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cnty., 810 So.2d 1056 (Fla.1st DCA 2002) (agency head deposition limited when other sources exhausted)