597 S.W.3d 613
Ark.2020Background
- Michael Myers, an employee of Arkansas Steel Associates (ASA), died when molten steel from a plant crane engulfed him; ASA paid workers’ compensation benefits to his widow, Mary Myers.
- Myers sued ASA’s parent corporations (seven appellees) in wrongful-death tort claims; the circuit court transferred the immunity question to the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission.
- Parties stipulated that the parent companies were principals/stockholders of ASA but were separate entities that did not make employment decisions, employ personnel at the site, or otherwise have direct employees who interacted with Myers.
- The Commission held the parent companies were immune under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) as principals/stockholders of an immune employer; the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Arkansas Supreme Court granted review, clarified that agency statutory interpretations are reviewed de novo, and affirmed the Commission’s finding that the parents were entitled to exclusive-remedy immunity under the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parent corporations are entitled to exclusive-remedy immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) absent a direct employment relationship with the injured employee | Myers: immunity applies only to the employee’s "actual" or direct employer; parents were not employers of her husband and so lack immunity | Parents: statute expressly extends immunity to principals and stockholders of an employer; their status as principals/stockholders suffices | Held: The statutory phrase "acting in his or her capacity as an employer" limits only "partner." "Principal, officer, director, [and] stockholder" are separate categories entitled to immunity when they are principals/stockholders of an immune employer; Commission’s finding supported by substantial evidence. |
| Whether § 11-9-105(a) is unconstitutional under Ark. Const. art. 5, § 32 insofar as it grants immunity to non-employers | Myers: Arkansas Constitution permits limiting workers’ comp to "actual" employers; extending immunity to non-employers exceeds constitutional authority | Parents: Legislature may define "employer" for workers’ compensation purposes; including principals/stockholders is a valid statutory definition | Held: Court reaffirmed precedent rejecting the "actual employer" argument; statute is constitutional here because parents were statutory employers (principals/stockholders) and immunity applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (U.S. 2003) (applies rule of the last antecedent in statutory construction)
- McCoy v. Walker, 317 Ark. 86 (Ark. 1994) (discusses interpretive effect of "or" and limiting phrases)
- Stapleton v. M.D. Limbaugh Constr. Co., 333 Ark. 381 (Ark. 1998) (prime-contractor immunity invalid absent statutory employment relationship)
- Miller v. Enders, 425 S.W.3d 723 (Ark. 2013) (rejected "actual employer" argument; reviewed agency statutory interpretation)
- Honeysuckle v. Curtis H. Stout, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 64 (Ark. 2010) (existence of employer-employee relationship is a factual issue for the Commission)