481 P.3d 1084
Wash.2021Background
- A Ferndale School District PE class of ~25 high‑school students took an off‑campus walk along West Smith Road led by teacher Evan Ritchie; the walk was informal and Ritchie did not follow the district’s formal field‑trip procedures or obtain parental permission.
- The class walked on a raised sidewalk separated from traffic by a fog line and an eight‑foot shoulder; students were spread out and, on the return leg, had their backs to traffic.
- A motorist who apparently fell asleep left the roadway, crossed the sidewalk, and struck four students; Gabriel Anderson (15) and another student died.
- The estate sued the driver and Ferndale for negligence; Ferndale moved for summary judgment arguing lack of duty/foreseeability and lack of proximate cause.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Ferndale; the Court of Appeals reversed, finding factual disputes on duty and proximate causation.
- The Washington Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in folding legal cause into duty, but concluded material factual disputes remained on proximate cause (both cause‑in‑fact and legal‑cause policy issues), so summary judgment was improper and the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cause in fact (proximate cause factual question) | Meyers: but‑for Ferndale taking students off campus without required procedures/precautions, Anderson would not have been struck (or would have been safer). | Ferndale: even with different precautions, the driver’s sudden sleep and rapid departure from roadway would have caused the accident regardless. | Dispute over but‑for causation is factual; summary judgment on cause in fact is improper. |
| Legal cause (policy—too remote?) | Meyers: school’s custodial relationship and failure to follow field‑trip policy make liability foreseeable and not too remote. | Ferndale: legal cause should be denied as a matter of law because the accident was fortuitous and extending liability would be unlimited. | Court: legal cause is a separate policy question; here it cannot be resolved for Ferndale as a matter of law—material policy/foreseeability issues remain for the jury. |
| Applicability/effect of district field‑trip policy & parental permission | Meyers: policy should have applied; parental refusal would have prevented the walk or produced safer conditions. | Ferndale: Ritchie and principal did not treat these walks as field trips so procedures did not apply. | Whether policy applied and whether noncompliance caused harm are disputed facts for the jury. |
| Policy concerns about broad liability for ordinary school activities | Meyers: liability can be limited by foreseeability, contributory negligence, superseding causes; protecting students is a key policy. | Ferndale: imposing liability here would chill routine school activities and create near‑unlimited exposure. | Court: rejects the argument that fear of unlimited liability requires dismissal; existing tort doctrines limit liability and the policy inquiry must be resolved at trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hendrickson v. Moses Lake Sch. Dist., 192 Wn.2d 269 (2018) (schools’ custodial relationship creates a special duty to protect students)
- N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 186 Wn.2d 422 (2016) (duty/foreseeability and proximate‑cause analysis; leave factual proximate‑cause issues to jury)
- Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468 (1998) (legal cause is distinct from duty and requires independent policy analysis)
- McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wn.2d 316 (1953) (schools may be liable for foreseeable intervening third‑party acts; foreseeability for jury)
- Lowman v. Wilbur, 178 Wn.2d 165 (2013) (summary‑judgment review standard and discussion of duty/legal‑cause interplay)
- Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768 (1985) (cause‑in‑fact is the but‑for inquiry)