722 F. App'x 26
2d Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiff Jill S. Meyer (born Feb. 1953) previously worked as a psychiatrist at the NJ VA (1994–2004) and filed multiple EEO complaints over the years.
- Meyer applied for staff psychiatrist vacancies announced in 2011/2012; her 2011 application rolled into the 2012 selection pool.
- Vacancy notice did not list board certification as a requirement, but the selection panel decided beforehand to interview only board‑certified candidates.
- The panel interviewed only board‑certified applicants and hired two younger psychiatrists (ages 31 and 38). Meyer is not board‑certified.
- Meyer alleged ADEA age discrimination and ADEA retaliation based on prior EEO activity; the VA EEO and the EEOC ruled for the VA, and the district court granted summary judgment to the VA. The Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age discrimination under ADEA | Meyer argues nonselection was due to age because the hires were younger | NJ VA argues selection preference for board certification (a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); no evidence linking decision to age | Court: No prima facie showing of age discrimination; mere fact hires were younger is insufficient to create inference of age bias |
| ADEA retaliation | Meyer contends panel retaliated for her prior EEO complaints and this was the first opportunity to act | NJ VA contends no causal connection; panel lacked knowledge of certain prior complaints and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason existed | Court: No causal connection—temporal gap (~8 years) is too long to infer retaliation; failed to make prima facie case |
| Pretext for panel’s board‑certification preference | Meyer argues preference for board certification was pretextual cover for discrimination | NJ VA maintains panel legitimately viewed board certification as qualification criterion | Court: Meyer offered no evidence showing preference was pretext; defendant’s articulated reason stands |
| Evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment | Meyer relies on circumstantial points (age of hires, prior complaints) to oppose summary judgment | NJ VA points to lack of age‑related evidence and absence of proximate temporal link | Court: Viewing evidence in plaintiff’s favor, no genuine issue of material fact; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishing burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (temporal proximity must be "very close" to support causation)
- Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free School Dist., 691 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. ADEA prima facie and burden shifting discussion)
- Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163 (mere age disparity among hires insufficient to survive summary judgment)
- Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (methods to show causal connection for retaliation claims)