Meyer v. Frakes
294 Neb. 668
| Neb. | 2016Background
- Barney D. Meyer was convicted in Pierce County of theft (CR11-12, 2–4 years) and burglary (CR11-29, 2–4 years) and was also separately sentenced on a second count labeled “being a habitual criminal” to 10 years; the habitual-criminal sentence was ordered concurrent to the burglary sentence and consecutive to the theft sentence.
- Neither Meyer nor the State filed a direct appeal from those convictions or sentences.
- Meyer filed a habeas corpus petition arguing the separate sentence for being a habitual criminal was void (because the habitual‑criminal statute is an enhancement, not a separate offense) and that he had served the lawful sentences and was unlawfully detained.
- The Lancaster County district court granted the writ, finding the separate habitual‑criminal sentence void and that Meyer had fully served the valid sentences and was entitled to discharge.
- The State appealed; Meyer remains in custody pending conditions of bond he has not met. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed and ordered Meyer’s release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "being a habitual criminal" is a separate crime that supports an independent sentence | Meyer: Habitual‑criminal statute is not a separate offense; a separate sentence for it is void. | State: (conceded in analysis) but argued the judgment of habitual criminality remained and could support enhancement. | Court: Habitual criminality is not a separate offense; a separate sentence for it is void. |
| Whether the burglary sentence (2–4 years) is legally deficient and subject to collateral correction in habeas to raise it to the habitual‑criminal mandatory minimum | Meyer: The burglary sentence is facially valid and fully served; cannot be collaterally attacked now. | State: By attacking the separate habitual sentence, it may collaterally attack the burglary judgment to obtain enhancement. | Court: A sentence within statutory limits is merely erroneous if it omits an enhancement; such errors are not void and cannot be collaterally corrected via habeas after full service. |
| Whether habeas corpus may be used by the State to re‑sentence a defendant to a greater term after the defendant has fully served the unenhanced sentence | Meyer: Habeas is for those unlawfully detained; State cannot use it to increase punishment for the same offense after finality. | State: Sought to treat the habeas proceeding as vehicle to correct the unenhanced sentence. | Court: State cannot use habeas to increase punishment; double jeopardy and finality bar resentencing after full service absent notice. |
| Whether Meyer is entitled to immediate release | Meyer: Having served valid sentences and being detained only on a void habitual‑criminal sentence, he is unlawfully imprisoned. | State: Contended continued detention is lawful by treating sentences as a unit or by asserting enhancement. | Court: Meyer proved unlawful detention; habeas granted and release ordered. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Rolling, 209 Neb. 243, 307 N.W.2d 123 (Neb. 1981) (habitual‑criminal statute is an enhancement, not a separate crime)
- State v. Gaston, 191 Neb. 121, 214 N.W.2d 376 (Neb. 1974) (procedure for imposing mandatory habitual enhancement rather than separate sentences)
- Kuwitzky v. O’Grady, 135 Neb. 466, 282 N.W. 396 (Neb. 1938) (collateral attack via habeas granted where petitioner fully served unenhanced sentence but had been separately sentenced for habitual criminality)
- Hickman v. Fenton, 120 Neb. 66, 231 N.W. 510 (Neb. 1930) (a valid but erroneously lenient sentence that has been served cannot later be increased by resentencing on collateral attack)
- Gamron v. Jones, 148 Neb. 645, 28 N.W.2d 403 (Neb. 1947) (separate habitual‑criminal sentence is void; errors in unenhanced sentence are not void and are not subject to habeas after full service)