462 S.W.3d 650
Ark.2015Background
- Metzner stopped at a Benton County sobriety checkpoint, exhibited signs of intoxication, refused portable and station breath tests, and was arrested for DWI.
- At the station Metzner again refused a breath test; Deputy Hahn obtained a search warrant and blood was drawn, yielding a BAC of .15%.
- Metzner moved to suppress the blood-test result, arguing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-205(a) (refusal provision) prohibits any chemical test after a refusal, including by warrant.
- The circuit court denied suppression, concluded the refusal provision bars only the warrantless implied-consent test, and convicted Metzner (bench trial) of DWI (second offense) and implied-consent refusal.
- On appeal the sole issue was statutory interpretation: whether the statute’s phrase “no chemical test shall be given” precludes obtaining blood by search warrant after a refusal.
- The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding the refusal clause applies to tests requested by officers under the implied-consent scheme and does not forbid warrant-based testing.
Issues
| Issue | Metzner's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 5-65-205(a)’s language “no chemical test shall be given” bars issuance/ use of a search warrant to compel blood testing after an arresting officer’s requested test is refused | The statute’s plain language forbids any chemical test after a refusal, so a warrant cannot be used to obtain blood | The refusal clause governs only the warrantless implied-consent test directed by officers; it does not restrict the State from obtaining a warrant | The court held the phrase applies to the officer-requested, warrantless implied-consent test authorized by §5-65-202 and does not prohibit obtaining a search warrant for blood testing |
Key Cases Cited
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishes expectation-of-privacy test and warrant requirement baseline)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (recognized exigency exception for blood draws where obtaining warrant would undermine evidence)
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (collection/testing of bodily fluids constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (Fourth Amendment requires a warrant when blood can reasonably be obtained without significantly undermining the search)
- State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (refusal clause construed to limit only officer-directed warrantless tests, not court-issued warrants)
- State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 2005) (construed similar refusal language to bar warrant use to compel testing)
