Metroflex Oceanside LLC v. Newsom
532 F. Supp. 3d 976
S.D. Cal.2021Background
- Plaintiffs are ten San Diego County gyms and fitness centers that sued state and local officials challenging COVID-19 restrictions that limited indoor gym operations.
- The FAC (first amended complaint) alleges federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a Fifth Amendment taking and Fourteenth Amendment due process violations, plus state-law claims for business losses.
- Challenged orders include California and County stay-at-home and tiered reopening orders enacted in 2020 and directives limiting indoor fitness activities.
- Defendants filed multiple motions to dismiss; the court granted judicial notice of public COVID-related materials but did not rely on most of them.
- The district court dismissed all federal claims for failure to state a claim (takings, substantive and procedural due process, and vagueness), found amendment futile as to federal claims (dismissed with prejudice), and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims (dismissed without prejudice).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment) | Orders deprived gyms of all economically beneficial use and thus constitute a per se or regulatory taking under Penn Central | Restrictions were temporary, reasonable public-health regulations not constituting a taking; Penn Central factors not satisfied | Dismissed — courts repeatedly reject COVID restrictions as a takings claim; plaintiffs failed to plead a compensable taking |
| Substantive Due Process (Fourteenth Amendment) | Plaintiffs have a property interest in conducting lawful business; restrictions violate due process | Right to pursue business is not a fundamental right; government action survives rational-basis review as relating to legitimate public-health goals | Dismissed — rational-basis applies and restrictions are rationally related to curbing COVID-19 spread |
| Procedural Due Process | Plaintiffs lacked individualized process and were deprived of property without adequate procedures | Orders are legislative/general public-health measures; no individualized process due; normal legislative procedures suffice | Dismissed — temporary, generally applicable restrictions do not trigger individualized procedural protections |
| Vagueness (Fourteenth Amendment) | Orders are vague about what conduct is penalized, leaving businesses uncertain | Orders provide sufficient guidance; FAC’s allegations are conclusory and inconsistent with other pleadings | Dismissed — plaintiffs failed to show the orders are impermissibly vague in all applications |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for motions to dismiss)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility requirement at pleading stage)
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (three-factor regulatory takings test)
- Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (Takings Clause framework)
- Bridge Aina Le‘a, LLC v. Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2020) (application of Penn Central factors)
- Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 2009) (substantive due process standards)
- Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (rational-basis review for non-fundamental rights)
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (identifying fundamental rights test)
- Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 1994) (burden on plaintiffs under rational-basis review)
- Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (vagueness challenge outside First Amendment requires showing impermissible vagueness in all applications)
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988) (declining supplemental jurisdiction when federal claims drop out early)