Mesa v. The City of San Antonio, Acting by and through its Agent, City Public Service Board d/b/a CPS Energy, 5:17-cv-00654

Background

Abel Mesa worked for CPS Energy from 1990 until an alleged involuntary retirement effective December 1, 2016; in 2013 his wife was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and Mesa took intermittent FMLA leave to care for her.
In September 2016 Mesa suffered a left-shoulder injury at work, was transported by ambulance, received work restrictions (9/13–9/16), then later obtained a full-duty release on 9/20.
CPS arranged a light-duty offer after the initial restrictions; later, because of allegedly conflicting medical releases and safety concerns, CPS requested a fitness-for-duty (human performance) evaluation.
Mesa missed or disputed the scheduling of the requested fitness-for-duty exam (disagreement whether he could attend 9/29 or 9/30); CPS placed him on paid administrative leave on 9/21 and then on unpaid personal leave effective 10/3 through 11/29, citing failure to appear for the exam and safety concerns; Mesa submitted an intent-to-retire (9/20) and completed retirement paperwork in November for a 12/1/2016 retirement.
Mesa sued asserting numerous claims; he conceded several (Rehabilitation Act, ADA for his own actual disability, FMLA for his own leave). The court narrowed the live issues to: (1) ADA “regarded as” disability claim, (2) ADA associational-disability claim (wife’s cancer), (3) FMLA retaliation for caring for his wife (unpaid-leave adverse action), and (4) ADEA age-discrimination claim.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
ADA “regarded as” disability — unpaid leave/termination	Mesa says CPS regarded him as impaired (safety risk; wanted MRI/HPE) and placed him on unpaid leave and effectively retired him because of that perception.	CPS says any perceived impairment was transitory and minor (he recovered quickly) and, alternatively, acted for legitimate reasons (he missed fitness-for-duty exam).	Court denied summary judgment as to unpaid-leave adverse action (fact issue whether perceived impairment was non-transitory/non-minor and motivated leave); granted summary judgment as to involuntary retirement/termination (decisionmakers relied on Mesa’s expressed intent to retire).
ADA associational-disability (wife’s cancer)	Mesa contends CPS treated him adversely because of his association with his disabled wife (suspicion about his absences; HR comments).	CPS argues there is no evidence decisionmakers acted because of wife’s disability; no hostile remarks tied to her condition; leave was approved and used for her care.	Summary judgment granted for CPS; Mesa failed to show wife’s disability was a determining factor.
FMLA retaliation (use of leave to care for wife)	Mesa argues temporal proximity, HR hostility to his FMLA use, and the unexplained decision to put him on long unpaid leave (rather than follow corrective-action policy) show retaliation for FMLA-protected leave.	CPS says leave played no role; action was due to failure to attend HPE and safety concerns; legitimate nonretaliatory reason provided.	Summary judgment denied as to unpaid-leave adverse action (sufficient temporal and circumstantial evidence to raise fact issue of pretext/retaliation); granted as to alleged forced retirement/termination.
ADEA age discrimination	Mesa asserts adverse actions were tied to retirement eligibility/retirement status (linked to age).	CPS contends decision was based on Mesa’s expressed intent to retire and safety/HPE issues, not age; pension/retirement status ≠ age-based animus.	Summary judgment granted for CPS; Mesa failed to show adverse action "because of" age or that retirement status served as proxy for age.

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for summary judgment and genuine dispute of material fact)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (party opposing summary judgment must show an essential element for trial)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (employer’s asserted reason can be disbelieved and inference of discrimination made)
Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs., N.A., Inc., 813 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing ADA “regarded as” coverage post-ADAAA)
Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2015) (employer perception standard under ADA “regarded as”)
Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2015) (pretext and corrective-action evidence can support discrimination inference)
Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cty., 446 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2006) (elements and temporal-proximity analysis for FMLA retaliation)
Ky. Retirement Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135 (U.S. 2008) (distinguishing pension/status decisions from age-based discrimination)
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (U.S. 1993) (employment action based on pension status is not necessarily age discrimination)